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ABSTRACT:
This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen sharehold-
ers—investors who enter the securities market primarily through employer-
sponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and
are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a
consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group
of investors.
Citizen shareholders are distinguishable from other shareholders on
the grounds of choice, exit, and the number of intermediaries inserted into
the investment chain in defined-contribution plans. They are largely miss-
ing from corporate policy and scholarship debates; few discussions have
incorporated the growing reality that shareholder status has changed over
the last several decades with how, why, and in what form individual inves-
tors enter the securities market. This group of investors, estimated to be
nearly 75 million Americans, is alienated from traditional corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms at both the operating company and the investment
company levels. Citizen shareholders complicate corporate law assump-
tions about shareholder empowerment, exacerbate tensions between man-
agement and control, and undermine corporate regulatory solutions such
as those advanced in Dodd Frank. Additionally, the disclosure-based re-
gime required under federal securities and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) laws are incomplete, fractured, and not tailored to
the needs of citizen shareholders, a group of investors that includes low-
dollar and often unsophisticated investors. As a result, citizen shareholders
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. This paper has
benefited from presentations at the University of St. Thomas: The Law & The History of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility Symposium, the George Washington University C-LEAF Junior
Scholar Workshop, and the faculties at Georgia State and Wake Forest. The thoughtful comments
and questions contributed to the completion and ultimate improvement of this paper.
99
100 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1
are long-term investors locked in a market system that rewards short-term
performance and facilitates exit over activism. Second, citizen shareholders
exercise constrained control over their self-directed accounts with limited
investment options, virtually no control over fee structures that erode re-
tirement savings, and splintered and incomplete information about their in-
vestments and the fees charged to them. Recognizing that retirement
investments play a crucial role for the individual and for society, this Arti-
cle proposes both theoretical and practical approaches to better incorpo-
rate the interests of citizen shareholders into the markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law scholarship has begun addressing the nuances and com-
plexity of the corporate governance framework.1 The simple two-party
agency framework of shareholders as principles and corporate management
as agents captures very little of modern corporate and investment structures.
Corporate law scholarship theorizes the balancing act and benefit of
direct shareholder rights.2 It also grapples with the role of retail, indirect
shareholders for whom corporate governance mechanisms are diluted by
their rational apathy, and representation by intermediaries.3 Corporate law
scholarship, to date, has not fully recognized a third category of investors, a
group that I call the citizen shareholders, and their unique position in the
governance and securities frameworks that regulate their investments.4
Citizen shareholders are investors who enter the securities market pri-
marily through employer-sponsored, self-directed defined-contribution
plans, such as the 401(k),5 and are the fastest growing group of investors.6
1. See generally JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPI-
TALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC
(2000) (describing the change in corporate ownership and the consequences); Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revalua-
tion of Governance Rights, 113 COL. L. REV. 863 (2013) (describing the dominance of institu-
tional shareholders).
2. Shareholder primacy theory includes two bedrock principles: (1) maximizing long term
shareholder value is the only legitimate objective of the corporation and (2) designing ways to
assist shareholders in exerting control through their powers, including the power to vote at annual
meetings, will minimize the agency costs that result from the separation of ownership from control
in publicly traded and diffusely held corporations. It is a direct outgrowth of agency theory. See
generally Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (2005); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Em-
pirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (1996). Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy
and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006) (describing the director
primacy theory where the board of directors is self-interested in company performance and is
assumed to be in the best position to monitor the company).
3. Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Rationally Apathetic Share-
holders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of Authority, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 547,
547 (2010) (acknowledging the “millions of other individual shareholders in the stock market,
otherwise known as ‘retail investors,’ who never pay attention to those annual reports and proxy
cards they receive in the mail. . . . It is simply too costly for retail investors . . . to make intelligent
voting decisions.”).
4. Current corporate law scholarship describing retirement investors includes STEPHEN DA-
VIS ET AL., THE NEW CAPITALISTS: HOW CITIZEN INVESTORS ARE RESHAPING THE CORPORATE
AGENDA (2006) (describing the evolution of corporate ownership and its link to retirement bene-
fits and the resulting civil economy); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities In-
termediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 2003–04 (2010) (discussing retirement investors); William
A. Birdthistle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund, 37 J. CORP. L. 771, 774 (2012) (discuss-
ing retirement investors).
5. Certain plans that mimic defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans are not “quali-
fied plans” under ERISA and therefore are not subject to certain ERISA regulations on funding
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As a group of investors they have assumed legal protections arising under
corporate and securities law as well as ERISA,7 but in reality are alienated
from these legal regimes that provide more lip service than substance to
their rights. The unique circumstances under which citizen shareholders
enter the market challenge assumptions about the voluntariness of their in-
vestment and distort investors’ power balance within the corporate govern-
ance framework. While shareholders as a whole are a diverse and multi-
interested group,8 we can identify commonalities among citizen sharehold-
ers—who are primarily indirect investors saving for long-term goals like
retirement and education9—to which corporate law and corporate actors
alike should be responsive.
Citizen shareholders invest in the market and bear the risks of market
performance—they are the economic interest holders. To the extent that
American employees have retirement benefits today, they are largely pro-
vided in self-directed, defined-contribution plans.10 This is the new reality
and vesting. 1 Phyllis Borzi, ERISA: A Basic Approach to Key Terms and Concepts Under Title 1
of ERISA, in ABA 25TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA BASICS A-17 (2011). These
plans include benefits offered by the government, public schools, nonprofit corporations, and
church plans that do not opt-in to ERISA; plans established under workers’ compensation, disabil-
ity, or unemployment laws; plans outside of the United States; and excess benefit plans only
offered to certain employees. BARRY KOZAK, EMP. BENEFIT PLANS 47, 51–61, 555 (2010); 29
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (1996). Employer sponsors who are outside of the scope of ERISA and thus
cannot offer qualified plans have alternative tax-deferred savings options available through Inter-
nal Revenue Code § 457(b) for government, church, and nonprofit employers and §§ 403(a-b) for
schools, churches, and nonprofit organizations. Id. at 47–48; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(5)
(2012).
6. See generally INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT
BOOK (52nd ed. 2012), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/2012_factbook.pdf (reporting data
for year end 2011); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2010 Form
5500 Annual Reports, 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2010pension
planbulletin.pdf (summarizing 2010 data regarding the number of current defined-contribution
participants). Only current participants are included in the seventy-five million estimates, which
does not capture former participants who have changed jobs or retired and converted accumulated
defined-contribution benefits into an individual savings account (IRA).
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ERISA].
8. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 69 (2012); Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Gov-
ernance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1829
(2011) (Horizontal conflicts “exist when investors have conflicts of interest, not with managers,
but amongst themselves. If shareholders have different interests, most notably divergent invest-
ment time horizons, then simply empowering investors risks advantaging one group of sharehold-
ers to the detriment of the rest.”).
9. “[M]ore than half (60 percent) of the $3.6 trillion in 401(k) plan assets at year-end 2012
was invested in mutual funds . . . .” Sean Collins et al., The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans:
Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP., June 2013, at 6, available at www.ici
.org/pdf/per19-04.pdf.
10. Fifty-one million Americans participated in 401(k) plans in 2011. Frequently Asked
Questions about 401(k) Plans, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, available at http://www.ici.org/
policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).  Roughly half of all compa-
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for nearly 75 million American workers.11 Sixty-three percent of first time
securities investors do so through self-directed, defined-contribution plans
suggesting both the strength and the longevity of this trend.12 A confluence
of events created an arranged marriage between individual financial secur-
ity and the performance of private securities markets.13 One way to promote
a happy marriage between the two is to encourage governance and securi-
ties frameworks that incorporate the citizen shareholder identity. To that
end, this Article is primarily descriptive in defining citizen shareholders,
cataloguing their attributes, and articulating their differences from other
shareholders currently discussed in corporate law literature. To illustrate the
application of the citizen shareholder identity, I offer both a theoretical and
a practical extension of the argument that citizen shareholders are distin-
guishable investors and that those differences matter for purposes of corpo-
rate governance and securities frameworks.14
In previous work, I focused on the limitations of the ERISA legislation
originally enacted to protect pension benefits, to adapt to the current land-
scape of retirement savings through individual securities accounts.15 In this
Article, I articulate how (1) choice, (2) exit, and (3) number of in-
termediaries inserted into the investment chain distinguish citizen share-
holders relative to other investors and the resulting consequences. The
differences are obvious with direct shareholders and more nuanced with
indirect shareholders, of which citizen shareholders are a subcategory. All
differences highlight the limitations of state corporate law and federal se-
nies offer retirement benefits in the form of 401(k) plans. See The Retirement Gamble Tran-
scripts, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financi
al-crisis/retirement-gamble/transcript-43/. Among Fortune 1000 companies, only 11 percent offer
defined-benefit or traditional pension plans. Steve Vernon, Retirement Plan Shift Is Creating a
Generation of Workers Unable to Retire, CBSNEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/retire
ment-plan-shift-is-creating-a-generation-of-workers-unable-to-retire/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
11. See generally INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 6 (reporting data for year
end 2011); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 6 (summarizing 2010 data regarding the number of
current, defined-contribution participants).
12. “Employer-sponsored retirement plans increasingly are the gateway to mutual fund own-
ership. Sixty-three percent of mutual fund-owning households that purchased their first fund in
2005 or later purchased that fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan, compared with
52 percent of those that made their first purchase before 1990.” Kimberly Burham, Michael
Bogdan & Daniel Schrass, Characteristics of Mutual Fund Investors, 2013, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. 1
(2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per19-10.pdf.
13. See infra Section II.
14. “The risk [of defined-contribution plan shortcomings] is not merely a problem for the
individual retirees. Rather, it is in our societal interest to ensure employees will retire with ade-
quate income security.” Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided
Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 361, 363 (2002).
15. Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution So-
ciety, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153 (2013) [hereinafter Retirement Revolution]; Anne Tucker, The Citizen
Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Ameri-
cans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299 (2012) [hereinafter The Citizen
Shareholder].
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curities laws as applied to citizen shareholders and their weak position rela-
tive to other investors.
The remaining five sections of this Article are organized as follows:
Part II articulates the definition of the citizen shareholder and identifies the
ways in which this class of investors is distinct from direct shareholders.
Part II also establishes that citizen shareholders are a unique subgroup of,
and are distinguishable from, indirect investors, like those who invest in
retail mutual and index funds.16 Parts III and IV describe the securities and
corporate governance frameworks, respectively, as well as highlight the
unique constraints for citizen shareholders. Part V suggests both a theoreti-
cal and regulatory approach to better incorporate citizen shareholders’ inter-
ests. Part VI offers concluding thoughts.
II. DISTINGUISHING CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS FROM
DIRECT & INDIRECT INVESTORS
The retirement landscape has undergone a regulatory revolution result-
ing in the defined-contribution society17 we have today where the average
worker saves for retirement by investing in private securities markets,
thereby becoming a shareholder.18 Retirement benefits are governed by ER-
ISA,19 which, when enacted in 1974, focused primarily on defined-benefit
plans like traditional pensions where retirees received fixed-sum payments
from employers based on salary and years of service.20 Self-directed, de-
fined-contribution plans—where an employer-sponsor provides individual
16. A mutual fund is:
[A]n investment company registered with the SEC that buys a portfolio of securities
selected by a professional investment adviser to meet a specified financial goal (invest-
ment objective). Mutual funds can have actively managed portfolios, where a profes-
sional investment adviser creates a unique mix of investments to meet a particular
investment objective, or passively managed portfolios, in which the adviser seeks to
track the performance of a selected benchmark or index. One hallmark of mutual funds
is that they issue “redeemable securities,” meaning that the fund stands ready to buy
back its shares at their current net asset value (NAV).
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 228. An index mutual fund is “[a] fund de-
signed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio of securities is either a
replicate or a representative sample of the designated market index. Often referred to as passively
managed portfolios.” Id. at 226.
17. “In a defined-contribution society, the policies more likely to be adopted are those that
channel government subsidies through individual accounts controlled by the taxpayer herself.”
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (2004).
18. See also TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS
AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM (2008); see generally ELLEN SCHULTZ, RETIREMENT HEIST: HOW
COMPANIES PLUNDER AND PROFIT FROM THE NEST EGG OF AMERICAN WORKERS (2011).
19. ERISA, supra note 7.
20. Alicia H. Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to De-
fined Contribution, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 365 (Gordon
L. Clark et al., eds., 2006) (providing the example of 1.5 percent of final three-year average pay
for each year of service, which adds up to 30 percent of income for an employee with a twenty-
year employment history with the firm).
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accounts as a savings vehicle for retirement21—have supplanted the de-
fined-benefit plan as the dominant vehicle of retirement savings.22
The shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans created a
retirement revolution23 and can be attributed, in part, to retirement evolu-
tions including (1) creating the individual retirement account (IRA) and a
successful model for self-directed savings, (2) strictly regulating defined-
benefit plans as compared to the relatively light regulation of self-directed
defined-contribution plans, (3) reducing fiduciary standards for self-directed
accounts, and (4) relaxing company stock holding rules in defined-contribu-
tion plans.24 These four changes to the ERISA landscape promoted the
model of self-directed retirement accounts like the 401(k).25 With self-di-
21. Borzi, supra note 5, at A-15 to A-16.
22. “The predominant form of private pension was the [defined-benefit] (DB) plan, under
which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon retirement.” Martin Gelter, The
Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 922 (2013);
see also Steven Sass, The Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nine-
teenth Century to 1980, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME, supra
note 20, at 83–84 (Gordon L. Clark & Alicia H. Munnell eds. 2007) (noting a “dramatic” expan-
sion of coverage from 15 percent in 1940 to approaching 50 percent in 1980).
23. For a compelling discussion of the shift in the retirement benefit landscape and the conse-
quences, see generally Ellen Schultz, supra note 18; Ghilarducci, supra note 18. See Tucker,
Retirement Revolution, supra note 15; see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1 (discussing the
complicated issues of consequences of the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution sys-
tems under ERISA).
24. Publicly traded companies may offer company stock as an investment option in their
401(k) plans. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4) (2012). Company stock is often offered as a
part of an employee stock ownership plan, also known as an ESOP. “[E]mployer stock regulations
for 401(k) plans with an ESOP differ from those for plans without one.” James J. Choi et al., Are
Empowerment and Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, 2 BROOKINGS PA-
PERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 151, 155 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
projects/bpea/fall%202005/2005b_bpea_choi.pdf. For a general discussion of ESOPs and a sum-
mary of the unique standards of review associated with them, see Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc.,
679 F.3d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012), which describes ESOP standards of review and compliance
duties. See also Jose´ Martin Jara, What Is the Correct Standard of Prudence in Employer Stock
Cases?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 541, 547–48 (2012) (discussing ESOP plans). There is no 10
percent limit on employer stock holdings in defined-contribution plans as there is in defined-
benefit plans giving employer-sponsors greater flexibility in structuring defined-contribution
plans. Choi et al., supra, at 155.
25. Common defined-contribution plans include Money Purchase plans, Target Benefit
plans, Profit Sharing plans, 401(k) plans, Stock Bonus plans, and Employee Stock Ownership
plans. See generally Borzi, supra note 5, at A-15 to A-16. The distinguishing feature of self-
directed defined-contribution plans, which is the subject of this paper, is that employers provide
separate benefit accounts that the plan maintains for each participant. Participants direct the in-
vestment allocation in these accounts and the employer may provide a matching or minimum level
of contribution to the account as well, 403(b) plans, available for employees of public schools,
employees of certain tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers, and 457 plans, available for
certain state and local governments and non-governmental entities tax exempt under IRC 501, are
also self-directed accounts. 403(b) Plan Basics, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571/ch01
.html (last visited May 7, 2014); IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/Retirement-Plans/IRC-457(b)-Deferred-Compensation-Plans (last visited May 7, 2014).
These plans have some unique distinguishing features including pass through voting. See e.g., 26
U.S.C.A. § 409 (2014) (discussing pass through voting rights of certain qualified plans including
ESOPs). For purposes of this Article, those distinctions are not addressed in the main arguments.
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rected defined-contribution plans, participants began to rely heavily on mu-
tual and index funds26 as investment options, thus increasing the number of
indirect investors and the significance of institutional investors.27
The political, regulatory, and economic changes facilitated the emer-
gence of the defined-contribution society—where a majority of individual
retirement savings are invested in private securities markets.28 These
changes also created citizen shareholders—investors who enter the securi-
ties market primarily through self-directed, defined-contribution plans, in-
vest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like
retirement.29
A. Diluted Indirect Investor Rights
Citizen shareholders are indirect owners with diluted information and
voting rights as compared to direct shareholders. Indirect shareholders in-
vest in an intermediary like a mutual or index fund, which expands the
original two-party framework in corporate law from shareholders as owner
and the board of directors as managers to include intermediaries.30 The sep-
aration of ownership from control in modern corporations is augmented for
indirect owners who are further distanced from corporate management of
26. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 9; see also Sean Collins et al.,
supra note 9, at 8 (finding that more than half of 401(k) assets were invested in mutual funds).
27. The expansion of the mutual funds industry is due in part to the rise of the 401(k) plan
where much of participants’ savings are invested. Gelter, supra note 22, at 960.
Mutual fund ownership has become so widespread largely because mutual funds are a
primary way that Americans save for retirement. Defined-contribution retirement plans
and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) often hold mutual funds, and the rapid growth
of these plans and accounts has increased mutual funds’ total share of retirement assets.
Mutual funds now hold approximately a quarter of U.S. retirement savings.
Molly Mercer et al., Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual
Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432 (2010).
28. “[W]ith the rise of self-directed defined contribution plans came the corresponding de-
pendence of participants on private securities markets, particularly in the form of mutual and
index funds.” Tucker, Retirement Revolution, supra note 15, at 176. “In a defined contribution
society, the policies more likely to be adopted are those that channel government subsidies
through individual accounts controlled by the taxpayer herself.” Zelinsky, supra note 17, at
453–54.
29. See Gelter, supra note 22, at 923 (“There were 20,035 DB plans and 8,587 DC plans with
more than 100 participants in 1975, but only 11,368 DB plans and 70,125 DC plans with more
than 100 participants in 2006.”).
30. “Mutual funds are financial intermediaries through which investors pool their money for
collective investment, usually in marketable securities.” Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticisms about
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 580 (2006). “[A] mutual fund is generally
regarded as an investment company (i) that publically sells the securities it issues; (ii) that, when
requested by investors holding its securities, redeems these securities; and (iii) that manages the
securities in its portfolio.” Larry D. Barnett, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Boards of Directors:
Financial Protection or Social Productivity?, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 489, 493–94 (2008). An index
mutual fund is “[a] fund designed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio
of securities is either a replica or a representative sample of the designated market index.” INVEST-
MENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 6, at 226.
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operating companies31 resulting in a separation of ownership from
ownership.32
Stock held through intermediaries, like mutual funds, decouples the
economic risks of investment from the management rights, intensifying the
original agency conflict.33 Economic risks and management rights are
decoupled from indirect ownership because the investor bears the risk of a
market decline (as well as the reward of a market rise) of the operating
companies in which the intermediary invests. But the intermediaries, not the
indirect investor, exercise voting and information rights in the direct com-
panies.34 Here we must make a crucial distinction between an investment
company and an operating company. In the last example, the intermediary
is an investment company, typically thought of as mutual, index, and hedge
funds.35 Operating companies produce products or services, whereas invest-
ment companies produce neither, but invest in operating companies that
31. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4 (1932); HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at xii-xiii.
32. “[O]wnership is no longer simply separate from control, but also from ownership—that
is, when the ultimate beneficial owners of corporations do not themselves own shares in any real
sense, but instead rely on institutional fund managers and other intermediaries.” Rodrigues, supra
note 8, at 1824.
33. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 876–78 (noting in Figure 1 the basis of their theory of
agency capitalism); Jill Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from
Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 878 (2010).
34. Where direct shareholders vote in annual director elections of the operating company as
well as various proxy proposals and end-of-company life decisions, like a merger, indirect share-
holders do not. The direct shareholder also receives operating company information before annual
meetings and any special votes. The indirect shareholder has no information or voting rights in the
operating company elections. Tucker, Retirement Revolution, supra note 15, at 178 (describing the
decreased voting and information rights of citizen shareholders as indirect owners as compared to
direct owners); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 523 (1990) (describing direct shareholder notice and voting rules). The intermediary fund
receives the information and the right to vote in the operating company. “[T]he corporation’s vote
holder is not the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporation, but instead an intermediary that
enables the investor to own an interest in a mix of shares packaged as a unitary investment vehi-
cle.” Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1828–29; see also Fisch, supra note 33, at 879 (“[I]nvestors
delegate to that intermediary complete authority over investment decisions subject only to the
specified terms of the investment vehicle. Investors have neither the power to approve, choose, or
veto specific investment decisions, nor do they have the power to initiate a change in intermedi-
ary’s investment strategy.”).
35. Intermediaries is a term associated with citizen shareholder investment and can implicate
many different actors in the investment framework such as investment advisers, custodian or re-
cord-keeping services, brokerage firms, clearing agents, research providers, etc., Matthew D.
Hutcheson, Uncovering and Understanding Hidden Fees in Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER
L.J. 323, 344–48 (2007) (describing fourteen different intermediaries that can be paid from de-
fined-contribution plan assets). In this Article, I primarily refer to mutual and index funds as
passive investment companies, which are also intermediaries. Passive investment companies, i.e.,
mutual funds, are distinguishable from active investment companies and intermediaries like hedge
funds. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, forthcoming in 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013) (describing the value of activist hedge
fund intermediary investors).
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do.36 Indirect shareholders receive periodic information37 about the inter-
mediary fund including financials, a management discussion of fund per-
formance, and a statement of how the fund voted portfolio securities in
operating company elections.38 Limitations of shareholders’ corporate gov-
ernance role in intermediaries and intermediaries’ flawed representation of
citizen shareholders’ interests are discussed in more detail in Section IV(D)
of this Article.
B. Voluntariness of Investment
How citizen shareholders enter the market distinguishes them from di-
rect and other indirect owners.39 Citizen shareholders have reduced
choice:40 the voluntariness or the “choice” involved in the investment deci-
sion for citizen shareholders is different in nature from other types of inves-
tors.41 Citizen shareholders are strongly encouraged to enter into the
securities market through tax incentives, the possibility of employer match-
ing contributions, automatic enrollment, and a lack of viable alternatives for
long-term savings goals.42 These features tip the scales in favor of market
36. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–101(c)(1) (2012) (stating “[A]n ‘operating company’ is an entity that
is primarily engaged, directly or through a majority owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in the pro-
duction or sale of a product or service other than the investment of capital.”); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(a)(1)(A) (2012) (defining “investment company” as any issuer which “is or holds itself out as
being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvest-
ing, or trading in securities.”).
37. Limitations of the disclosure regime for citizen shareholders are discussed in more detail
in Section IV.E of this Article, infra.
38. Jill Fisch, supra note 4, at 1970 (2010); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.331, 274.130 (2013)
(requirements to report schedules of portfolio holdings); Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Port-
folio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No.
8393, Exchange Act Release No. 49,333, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed.
Reg. 11,254, (Mar. 9, 2004) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (describing the
management discussion of fund performance); C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (describing the requirement
that investment companies disclose proxy voting record for the year).
39. “Other indirect owners” means investors in mutual or index funds who do so as retail
investors in accounts separate from employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, such as an
IRA or a private brokerage account.
40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349,
1393–1401 (2012) (describing the consequences of automatic enrollment defaults with defined-
contribution plans and how they increased participation by altering participants’ choice); see also
Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 481
(2001) (discussing the role of automatic enrollment and other incentives to participate in defined-
contribution plans).
41. Citizen shareholders’ constrained choice to invest in the market, the challenges it poses to
voluntary assumption of risk, and the consequences on investor incentives and motivations are the
subject of a separate article. For a general discussion on notions of choice and assumption of risk,
see Sunstein, supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the
Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 331–37 (2007) (discussing
the role of automatic enrollment and other incentives to participate in defined-contribution plans).
42. See, e.g., Janice Kay McClendon, The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans:
Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 809, 812 (2007) (“To encourage asset
accumulation, the Act allows employers to automatically enroll plan participants in the salary
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participation, promote investment, and are good for savings. These features
also affect the voluntary assumption of risk of market performance, which
likely has consequences for fundamental economic theories underlying in-
vestor behavior regarding rationality and information.43
For citizen shareholders, the voluntariness of the decision to invest is
different from a self-initiated decision to invest discretionary money, as
may be the case with many direct and indirect investors.44 “[M]ost ordinary
Americans have little choice but to invest in the market. They are in essence
‘forced capitalists.’”45 The menu of investment options offered within a
defined-contribution plan—often mutual or index funds along with money
market, bonds, or company stock46—alters investment choice for citizen
shareholders as well. They are not investing in an open market but, instead,
choose47 among a limited range of investment vehicles48 where choice is
context-dependent.49 Empirical research has documented the relationship
deferral feature of a 401(k) plan, essentially forcing participants to opt out of making contribu-
tions, and then provides for annual increases in the automatic salary deferral contribution percent-
age.”); see also D. Bruce Johnsen, Who Captures the Rents From Unionization? Insights From
Multiemployer Pension Plans, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 193, 219 (2012) (“Rather than making a
pension promise to workers in the form of a life annuity on retirement conditional on continued
employer solvency, defined-contribution plans simply make ongoing contributions to a trust on
workers’ behalf for the duration of his or her working life.”).
43. For a discussion of investor-focused challenges to the modern portfolio theory, see James
Hawley et al., Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance, ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT, Fall
2011, at 4, 5.
44. Investors who roll over a 401(k) or other defined-contribution account into an IRA or
private brokerage account upon retirement or a job change confront a similar problem with
“choice” as do citizen shareholders. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 401(k) Plans: Labor
and IRS Could Improve the Rollover Process for Participants 29 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/652881.pdf.
45. Leo E. Strine Jr., Keynote Address at William Mitchell College of Law Public Square
Lecture Series, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests
of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance (Mar. 10, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/MinnesotaSpeech.pdf).
46. See, e.g., INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE., supra note 6, at 110–11 (describing de-
fined-contribution asset allocations in equities, funds, company stock, bonds, and money market
accounts).
47. Participant choice, or “control” over plan assets in his individual account creates a safe
harbor that shields the employer-sponsor and any plan fiduciary from liability. ERISA § 404(c);
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2012) (“If a participant or benefici-
ary of an ERISA section 404(c) plan exercises independent control over assets in his individual
account in the manner described in paragraph (c), then no other person who is a fiduciary with
respect to such plan shall be liable for any loss, or with respect to any breach of part 4 of title I of
the Act, that is the direct and necessary result of that participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of
control.”).
48. McClendon, supra note 42, at 813 (“ERISA Section 404(c) participants face the often
daunting task of choosing between an average of eighteen fund options.”); Anne M. Tucker, The
Citizen Shareholder, supra note 15, at 1333–34 (2012) (describing investment options within a
defined-contribution plan); id. at 1336–40 (describing the mutual funds included in defined-contri-
bution plans offered by the three case study companies Wal-Mart, IBM, and Well-Point discussed
in the Article).
49. Fisch, supra note 4, at 2003–04 (2010) (describing the limited choice of retirement inves-
tors within a 401(k) plan); Stabile, supra note 14, at 378–79.
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between choice options and choice preference in consumer goods and in
investment decisions.50 Within this universe of restricted choice, citizen
shareholders invest heavily in mutual or index funds and therefore are more
likely to be indirect, rather than direct, shareholders.51 These features of the
retirement system positively (although insufficiently) promote retirement
savings,52 but also create investment circumstances unique to citizen
shareholders.
Constrained choice is also evident in the percentages employees invest
in employer provided stock when it is an option in the plan.53 Even where
employers include an open window brokerage account,54 which gives par-
ticipants access to a wide range of funds traded on the market, choice is still
constrained because of behavioral biases such as endorsement, inertia, im-
mobilization, and procrastination that prevent many participants from utiliz-
ing this option.55 Because they rely upon biases and hierarchies, investors
50. Stabile, supra note 14, at 379–80 (describing work by Professor Cass Sunstein, Profes-
sors Shlomo Benartzi, and Richard Thaler as well as a recent EBRI study).
51. “At year-end 2012, mutual funds held in DC plans and IRAs accounted for $5.3 trillion,
or 27 percent, of the $19.5 trillion U.S. retirement market. The $5.3 trillion in mutual fund retire-
ment assets represented 41 percent of all mutual fund assets at year-end 2012.” Investment Com-
pany Institute, 2013 Investment Co. Fact Book at 132 (2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
2013_factbook.pdf (reporting data for year end 2012). “The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to
the enormous expansion of the mutual funds industry, in which much of these savings are in-
vested. Gelter, supra note 22, at 960:
Mutual fund ownership has become so widespread largely because mutual funds are a
primary way that Americans save for retirement. Defined-contribution retirement plans
and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) often hold mutual funds, and the rapid growth
of these plans and accounts has increased mutual funds’ total share of retirement assets.
Mutual funds now hold approximately a quarter of U.S. retirement savings.
Mercer, supra note 27, at 432.
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
53. Participant choices regarding company stock may be subject to biases such as loyalty
(feeling like they should invest in the company), endorsement (inclusive signals endorsement of
the safety of the investment), and familiarity (in a world of unknown investments the informed
decision to go select the one you know). See Choi et al., supra note 24, at 157–58. “[M]any
employees invest heavily in employer stock out of a sense of loyalty to their employers, an exam-
ple of bounded self-interest. This loyalty may be particularly true of women, who make up a
growing part of the workforce.” Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan
Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 92 (2002). Investment in company stock, in employer stock
as a percentage of total 401(k) assets, declined “from 19% in 1996 to 8% in 2010.” David
Blanchett, Employer Stock Consideration in 401(k) Plans, MORNINGSTAR INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT, 3 (2012), available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocu
ments/ResearchPapers/EmployerStockIn401kPlans.pdf.
54. See Stabile, supra note 14, at 385 (“One way to avoid problems created by framing is
moving to so-called ‘open option’ plans, as a number of employers have done.”); see also Mc-
Clendon, supra note 42, at 831 (“[A]n increasing number of plan sponsors offer[ ] a brokerage
option with virtually unlimited investment options. Most participants invest in just two or three
investment alternatives, with each selected investment concentration significantly more than the
recommended ten to twenty percent concentration.”).
55. See generally Richard H. Thaler, Shifting our Retirement Savings into Automatic, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2013, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/Shift
ing%20Our%20Retirement%20Savings%20Into%20Automatic.pdf (discussing procrastination bi-
ases). “Recent lessons from behavioral economics also yield powerful lessons, explaining such
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behave similar to consumers in ordinary commercial transactions when
faced with a decision for which they lack information.56
Citizen shareholders’ retirement savings are funneled into securities
markets under conditions that call into question the voluntariness of the
decision to invest, and subsequent allocations which have consequences for
axioms of the “general” investor regarding assumptions of risk, as well as
incentives and capacity to monitor investments.57
C. Diluted Rights of Citizen Shareholders: Exit
Citizen shareholders are distinguishable from both direct and other
types of indirect shareholders on an important element of shareholder
rights: exit.58 When a direct shareholder is unsatisfied with the operating
company’s performance or policy, she can exit by selling her shares on the
market and investing in a more suitable alternative. For indirect investors
who invest through brokers or individual online accounts, and do so outside
of the context of a defined-contribution plan—in other words, retail inves-
tors—they have strong exit rights.59 Retail investors have been compared to
traditional consumers of ordinary products like breakfast cereal who can
“sever their relationships with suppliers by refusing to buy from the sup-
phenomena as procrastination (people delay saving, do not save, or do not save enough), inertia
(people stay where they are), and immobilization (whereby conflicts and confusion lead people to
behave passively, like a deer in the headlights).” Nicholas Barr & Peter Diamond, Reforming
Pensions: Lessons from Economic Theory and Some Policy Directions, 11 ECONOMIA 1, 9 (2010);
Choi et al., supra note 24, at 157–58.
56. See Stabile, supra note 14, at 378–79 (describing choice theory).
57. “[B]ecause of the wholesale shift from defined benefit pensions to defined contribution
plans by both corporate and governmental employers, many fund shareholders have come to hold
their investments involuntarily.” William A. Birdthistle, supra note 4, at 774.
58. I will address the practical and theoretical implications of weakened exit rights and dis-
proportionate effects on citizen shareholders in a separate, dedicated paper in order to seriously
position these arguments within the existing literature.
59. Traditional indirect shareholders are also thought to have robust exit rights because they
can redeem their interest in an open-ended fund at “the funds’ net asset value per share (NAV),”
usually within twenty-four hours. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102–05 (2010)
(describing exit as a dominant mutual fund investor strategy despite the presence of switching
costs such as load fees and potential tax consequences); see also Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund
Scandals—A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of
Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 67, 74 (2006) (describing open-ended funds as dom-
inating the market).
A complete discussion of exit rights of indirect investors should take into consideration exit fees,
also called sales load or deferred sales charges. Investors withdrawing assets subject to an exit fee
are charged a percentage of their total investment at the time of withdrawal. See e.g., Mutual
Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm#
salesloads (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). The Investment Company Institute reported that “[i]n 2012,
the average maximum sales load of equity funds offered to investors was 5.3 percent.” Average
Expense Ratios Paid by Mutual Fund Investors Continued to Decline in 2012, INVESTMENT COM-
PANY INSTITUTE, http://www.ici.org/pressroom/news/13_news_trends_expenses (last visited Apr.
11, 2013). The ICI report noted that fees actually paid by investors were lower due to fee waivers
and that load fees overall had declined “roughly 75 percent since 1990.” Id.
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plier again.”60 The threat of strong exit rights are thought to exert some
market forces on the mutual fund market such as focus on quarterly earn-
ings reports and competition with regard to fund fees, expenses, and ser-
vices.61 For citizen shareholders, however, exit rights are constrained by the
terms of the employer-sponsored, self-directed defined-contribution plan.
Control over plan options exercised by the employer-sponsor or plan ad-
ministrators, and additional intermediaries unique to the citizen shareholder
investment chain, warp exit remedies.
Citizen shareholders invest their contributions in one of the approxi-
mately seventeen to twenty funds typically included in a plan by the em-
ployer-sponsor or plan administrator.62 To exit from a fund included in the
employer’s plan, there must be a suitable alternative investment within the
plan that offers a similar asset risk level and eliminates the source of dissat-
isfaction with the first fund (i.e., lower fees, non-inclusion of objectionable
operating company, etc.).63 How citizen shareholders enter the market con-
strains their choice as to the initial investment allocation, but it also con-
strains their choice to exit.64
Additionally, the robust exit rights of retail investors can have negative
consequences for unsophisticated investors who lack the financial under-
standing or ability to exit effectively, such as citizen shareholders.65 With
60. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 88.
61. Id. at 103 (distinguishing between redemption rights of mutual fund holders versus direct
stockholders in operating companies who do not usually have unilateral exit by redemption
rights). See infra Part IV.E for a discussion of market competition and earnings returns.
62. See Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder, supra note 15, at 1327–28 (describing investment
options within a defined-contribution plan); id. at 1336–40 (describing the mutual funds included
in defined-contribution plans offered by the three case study companies Wal-Mart, IBM and Well-
Point discussed in the article); McClendon, supra note 42, at 831 (finding an average of eighteen
funds included in defined-contribution plans). See also ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(C).
63. Cf. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 113.
Exit still dominates voting and litigation even for investors in 401(k) plans, however,
because the costs of voting and litigating against funds held in 401(k) plans are particu-
larly high and the benefits are particularly low. The tax code restricts participation in
these plans to individuals and to small amounts of money—currently a maximum of
$15,500 per year. These small individual investors are the least likely investors to be-
come active because they encounter the standard collective action problem of corporate
governance most severely. Moreover, even though switching costs are high, they are not
impossibly high: employees can ask their employers to switch providers or expand
choices.
Id. Additionally the presence of brokerage window features within plans may make exit a more
viable option for sophisticated participants.
64. Once again, the presence of an open brokerage window lessens the constraint of investing
through an employer-sponsored plan but does not eliminate constraint for investors who may be
inhibited by behavioral biases such as endorsement, inertia, etc. See Choi et al., supra note 24, at
157–58.
65. See generally Jason Karceski et al., Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions 9 (Jan. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1
.167.6016&rep=repl&type=pdf (discussing costs to shareholders); see also Fisch, supra note 4, at
1994.
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ready exit, there is little incentive for shareholder monitoring activity by
large and sophisticated investors on which competitors and unsophisticated
investors can free-ride.66 A sinking ship analogy works well here. Imagine
that all of the investors in an intermediary fund are passengers on a sinking
ship, which will represent a poorly performing mutual fund. Retail investors
who invest outside of a defined-contribution plan can (and rationally
should) exit. Even if many retail investors do not actually exit, their easy
exit ability should act as a powerful disincentive for other investors to mon-
itor and seek management changes to improve the performance of the fund.
Ready exit rights have the potential to distort which investors bear negative
economic risks, as well as the incentives, for shareholder activism.
In either scenario (exit of other investors or merely activism disincen-
tive), citizen shareholders are disadvantaged relative to other investors in
the fund as a result of their constrained exit rights. In a poorly performing
fund in which both indirect and citizen shareholders invest, citizen share-
holders are more locked into the investment and thus more likely to bear
negative economic risks.67 In other words, weakened exit means that a de-
cline should disproportionately affect citizen shareholders. Monitoring and
participation are then likely left to the class of investors with few tools of
negotiation, low dollar amounts invested, high monitoring costs, and mar-
ket-entry conditions that challenge the voluntariness of market
participation.
Citizen shareholders, like all indirect shareholders, have diluted infor-
mation and voting rights in operating companies as compared to direct
shareholders because of their distance from the operating company and in-
vestment through intermediaries. Citizen shareholders, however, are distin-
guishable from other indirect retail shareholders because of unique features
of their investment chain. Funneling retirement investors in private securi-
ties markets and inserting additional intermediaries specific to the defined-
contribution system challenges voluntariness, constrains choice in asset al-
location, and restricts exit. The net effect of these differences is that citizen
shareholders bear economic risks similar to direct and indirect shareholders,
but do so with relatively weakened rights.
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
As stated, citizen shareholders are predominantly indirect owners, in-
vesting in public mutual and index funds. Investment companies, like other
66. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 130. But see id. (arguing that investors may benefit
because the ready exit remedy should promote market competition and increase efficiency as a
result).
67. Note that some citizen shareholders will remove funds via a loan or subject to the early
withdrawal penalty. See e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUND ´EN, COMING UP SHORT: THE
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 39 (2004) (discussing the lure to cash out retirement plans for cash
or when changing jobs despite the penalties).
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financial service providers, are regulated under securities laws including the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,68 the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940,69 the Investment Company Act of 1940
(ICA),70 and the corresponding Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
rules.71 Together, these laws establish the regulatory framework for public
investment companies. Under the ICA, public investment companies, in-
cluding mutual funds, must register with the SEC, which requires extensive
disclosures modeled after the disclosures mandated for operating compa-
nies.72 In addition to the disclosures required by the SEC, citizen sharehold-
ers also receive disclosures required by the Department of Labor (DOL),
which oversees employer-sponsored benefit plans.73
The securities regulation regimes attempt to create a “system of full
disclosure” to protect investors.74 Securities regulations seek to protect in-
vestors from opportunistic behaviors within the securities markets that take
advantage of information asymmetries by addressing information dispari-
ties.75 A ready line of defense in corporate reform is often enhanced disclo-
68. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77b
(2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78o (2012)).
69. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–21 (2000)).
70. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)).
71. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.0-2 to 275.222-1 (2012) for Investment Advisers Act of 1940; 17
C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2012) for Investment Company Act of 1940.
72. Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 11, 15 (2006).
73. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL RULE TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND EXPENSES
TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE RETIREMENT PLANS 2 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5. For a discussion of DOL disclosure
obligations, see Section IV.E.
74. THOMAS L. HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 2 (3d ed. 2011), available at http://www
.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/fedsec3d.pdf/$file/fedsec3d.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1
(describing the purpose and policy of the Investment Company Act of 1940 in regulating the
purchase of securities issued by investment companies “without adequate, accurate, and explicit
information, fairly presented, concerning the character of such securities and the circumstances,
policies, and financial responsibility of such companies and their management” because it ad-
versely affects national public interest).
75. Securities regulation exists to ensure that investors are adequately protected from
potential opportunistic behavior by securities market counterparties, whether they be
issuers or broker-dealers or other market participants. It seeks to force those counterpar-
ties to internalize the costs of their activities and to correct power and information im-
balances, such as those between management and shareholders. In other words, the
purpose of securities regulation is to correct a perceived market failure: investors, in
policymakers’ perceptions, are not capable of fully protecting their interests given the
natural information disparities between investors and those who would be the target of
or intermediary for their investment capital.
Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The Limitations of the Corporate Governance
Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 274–75 (2013); see also Amir N. Licht, Genie in a
Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in International Securities Transactions, 2000
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 104 (2000).
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sure obligations.76 The disclosure-based regime as it is currently enacted,
however, is subject to substantial criticisms and is discussed in more detail
in Section IV(E).77
IV. EMPOWERMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS, BUT NOT
CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS
The retirement revolution that resulted in the rise of self-directed de-
fined-contribution plans and the creation of the citizen shareholders has
been linked to rising popularity of shareholder primacy reforms, which seek
to enhance shareholder voice in corporate governance to serve as a balanc-
ing mechanism against managerial control.78 Professor Martin Gelter attrib-
utes the regulatory emphasis on shareholder empowerment79 in part to the
dependence of the “politically relevant middle class” on the securities mar-
kets to save for retirement and college education for children.80 The growth
of citizen shareholders parallels the rise of shareholder primacy. “The hope
of reducing agency costs through institutional activism has led to regulatory
and structural changes to increase shareholder power.”81 As retirement
wealth became dependent, not on specific employer success, but on the suc-
cess of the capital markets as a whole, greater public attention was paid to
the role of the shareholder in the corporate management equation. “Numer-
ous developments, including recent calls for increased shareholder activism,
regulatory reforms that increase institutional investor obligations to vote
responsibly, attempts to expand shareholder voting rights (via proxy access
and say-on-pay initiatives), and the move from plurality to majority voting
in director elections,”82 enhance the role of shareholder voting and attempt
to increase shareholder power. But the identity (and rights) of a direct
shareholder is different from the identity (and rights) of citizen sharehold-
ers. Increasing shareholder voice and vote in corporate management largely
76. “[D]isclosure is the chief tactic that financial reform legislation has embraced. . . .
[A]lthough it is politically easy to impose a disclosure mandate, recent research questions whether
disclosure alone is enough to influence investor behavior.” Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1850.
77. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 303, 325 (2008) (describing mutual fund disclosures as “dismal”). Cf. the disclosure
and structural mandates of the ICA to the disclosure-only model of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
78. See Gelter, supra note 22, at 922–23.
79. Id. at 910.
80. By contrast, [Gelter argues] that one of the most important reasons [if not the main
reason] for the shift is a fundamental change in the supply side of the capital market,
which has led to the heightened importance of interests of financial investors. Specifi-
cally, [Gelter suggests] that changes in the pension system helped to transform corporate
governance into a system dominated by the shareholder interest, to the detriment of the
managerial model . . . . [A] large part of the populace, at least the politically relevant
middle class, became dependent on capital markets for retirement savings. . . .
Id. at 911.
81. Fisch, supra note 33, at 884.
82. Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 649, 650–51 (2009); see also Fisch, supra note 33, at 884.
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excludes citizen shareholders—those very investors who embodied the need
for such mechanisms.
A. Why Shareholder Empowerment Means Little for Citizen
Shareholders
Despite the shareholder empowerment focus of corporate reforms, citi-
zen shareholders are not empowered by augmented disclosures or voting
rights. Who then is empowered? Individual investors and intermediaries
such as mutual, hedge, and pension funds that invest directly in operating
companies are empowered by augmented shareholder accountability mech-
anisms.83 Empowering intermediaries decouples the economic risks borne
by indirect investors, including citizen shareholders, from the governance
rights exercised by intermediaries. Decoupling is a documented problem for
all indirect investors because intermediaries may not provide effective rep-
resentation.84 Intermediary representation is a heightened problem for citi-
zen shareholders in particular because they invest through employer-
sponsors and plan administrators. These additional intermediaries in the in-
vestment chain exert pressures on the checks and balances of the govern-
ance framework and extract their own costs from citizen shareholders. As a
result, unique conflicts of interest also arise in the context of defined-contri-
bution plans such as client identity, fee structures, and investment time
horizons.
1. Decoupling Effect of Distance and Intermediaries for Indirect
Investors
Shareholder accountability procedures have limited applicability to in-
direct investors, especially citizen shareholders who are invested through
defined-contribution plans. Many corporate governance reforms focus on
increased shareholder disclosures85 and enhanced shareholder voting rights,
including, for example, increased proxy access and shareholder say on ex-
ecutive compensation.86 Such reforms, however, largely exclude the inter-
83. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 867 (2013) (“[T]he move to reconcentrated own-
ership in investment intermediaries is a consequence of two factors: first, the political decisions to
privatize retirement provisioning . . . and to facilitate advance funding; and second, the intellectual
triumph of modern portfolio theory, which promotes diversification as the touchstone investment
strategy.”).
84. Id.
85. “[I]n an environment in which the investor has not made a conscious investment choice
at all, the SEC’s solution is to require more disclosure.” Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1865. Disclo-
sure is discussed in more detail in Sections IV.E and V of this Article.
86. See Choi et al., supra note 82, at 650–51 (describing regulatory reforms aimed at increas-
ing shareholder voting power); see also Federal Stimulus Bill and TARP Mandate Additional
Corporate Governance Requirements, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, http://www.corporate
complianceinsights.com/corporate-governance-requirements-federal-stimulus-bill-tarp/ (last vis-
ited May 7, 2014) (outlining some of the corporate governance mandates for companies receiving
government funding from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)).
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ests of indirect owners.87 The decoupling effect of indirect ownership has
“substantial consequences for the debate over shareholder
empowerment.”88
Little of [corporate law scholarship] considers that the “empower-
ment” of stockholders does not empower end-user investors so
much as it empowers intermediaries . . . [or] the fact that undiffer-
entiated empowerment of these so-called stockholders may dis-
proportionately strengthen the hand of . . . institutions who have
short-term . . . objectives that are at odds with the interests of
individual . . . investors.89
For example, in response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted
Dodd-Frank90 in 2010, which imposed additional regulatory obligations on
all publically traded companies pertaining to proxy access and say-on-pay.
In response, the SEC promulgated executive compensation disclosure
rules.91 Only direct owners, like intermediary fund managers and individual
direct owners, can exercise the enhanced say-on-pay voting rights, not indi-
rect shareholders.92
87. “While it would be obviously wrong to equate shareholder primacy with shareholder
power, there are reasons to believe that pro-shareholder mechanisms such as ‘modern’ executive
compensation are often cosmetic and do not actually benefit shareholders all that much.” Gelter,
supra note 22, at 920; see also id. at 969 (“Many shareholder primacists would probably agree
that pro-shareholder reforms often remain cosmetic.”). Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 1639–1644
(describing the positive returns associated with activist intermediary investments by hedge funds).
88. Fisch, supra note 33, at 883–84.
89. Strine, supra note 45, at 12; cf. Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 1667 (criticizing claims of
short-termism by Chancellor Strine, Justice Jacobs, and Martin Lipton as unsubstantiated). “Insu-
lation advocates have thus far failed to provide empirical evidence showing that activist interven-
tions are followed in the long term by losses to target companies or their shareholders.” Id.
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in various sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
91. See Corporate Governance Issues, Including Executive Compensation Disclosure and
Related SRO Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/
corporategovernance.shtml (last modified Oct. 28, 2013) (describing enhanced shareholder disclo-
sures and votes on executive compensation under sections 951-955 of Dodd-Frank). The com-
bined effect of these reforms was to increase corporate disclosures to shareholders and their voting
rights with regard to executive compensation and management proxy slates. See Fisch, supra note
33, at 885–86 (describing increased shareholder voting power as a result of reforms focused on
say-on-pay and director nominations). The proxy access rules, proposed by the SEC under Dodd-
Frank authority, were challenged by the Business Roundtable and were struck down by the D.C.
Court of Appeals on the basis of an inadequate regulatory record. Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647
F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The petitioners also maintain, and we agree, the Commission
relied upon insufficient empirical data when it concluded that Rule 14a–11 will improve board
performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder
nominees.”).
92. Citizen shareholders, as indirect owners, would neither receive the compensation package
disclosures directly nor cast a vote in support or rejection of the pay packages. Direct shareholders
(including funds in which citizen shareholders are invested), would exclusively exercise both the
information and voting rights on say-on-pay.
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Additionally, the rational apathy of citizen shareholders, as indirect
owners, makes these corporate reforms symbolic, but ineffective, tools.
“[T]he feasibility of improving corporate decision-making through share-
holder empowerment depends critically on the actions and incentives of
those empowered shareholders.”93 For all indirect shareholders, including
citizen shareholders, the incentives to monitor and participate in corporate
governance are so diluted as to be meaningless, exacerbating the widely
discussed “rational apathy” of shareholders in public companies.94
The monitoring burden increases with indirect owners. To monitor
corporate-level actions, an indirect investor must know the companies in
which her funds are invested, which she can obtain from the fund’s pro-
spectus and annual disclosures.95 She must then monitor the operating com-
panies’ disclosures about voting rights and major corporate events. If she
has a preference regarding an upcoming vote, corporate event, or policy
debate, she must communicate that to the intermediary. Next, she would
have to monitor the intermediaries’ disclosures about how it cast its vote or
proxy in the operating company’s vote96 and monitor the operating com-
pany’s disclosures to learn of the outcome of the vote. The direct share-
holder, on the other hand, personally receives the operating company’s
disclosure, along with the proxy solicitation form to be completed, and will
also receive information regarding the outcome.97 Even if the motivations
to monitor the actions of operating companies were the same as between
direct and indirect shareholders, the participation burden is appreciably in-
creased in terms of time and money for indirect investors.
B. Intermediary Representation
Indirect shareholders, including citizen shareholders, are represented
by the intermediary fund in which they invest, such as a mutual fund. The
mutual fund, a passive investment company or intermediary, participates in
93. Fisch, supra note 33, at 879.
94. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, A Frame Work for the Regulation of Securities Market In-
termediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 45–46 (2004) (describing “collective action” problems
with shareholder activism).
95. See, e.g., Form N-Q, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.332, 274.130 (2014) (SEC form used by regis-
tered management investment companies pursuant to requirements to report quarterly schedules of
portfolio holdings which the SEC then makes public); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Shareholder
Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8393. https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8393.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2004) (explaining the SEC’s adoption of the rule and form amendments to improve
disclosure).
96. See Investment Company Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,254, (Mar. 9, 2004)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (describing the management discussion of
fund performance); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (describing the requirement that investment compa-
nies disclosure proxy voting record for the year).
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2012) (indicating the information that is required in a
proxy statement).
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governance at the operating company level. Intermediaries vote on behalf of
large blocks of capital and should have expertise as well as increased moni-
toring and participation incentives over indirect shareholders.98 Intermedi-
ary representation of indirect investors has been widely criticized in
corporate scholarship as passive and not in alignment with indirect inves-
tors’ interests.99 The following is a brief summary of the work of other
scholars in this area.
Mutual funds and index funds, as intermediary investment compa-
nies,100 have a reputation of passivity rather than shareholder activism.
98. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 886 (documenting the dominance of finan-
cial intermediaries in control of large blocks of U.S. equity assets); Katharine V. Jackson, To-
wards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 323 (2011) (describing the power of mutual fund managers due to the
size of votes they represent); William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (arguing that the
mutual fund “industry’s faults can be found in the idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a struc-
ture that exacerbates the ability of managers to wield substantial power and to use that power to
extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from shareholders.”).
[S]ome observers have criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers.
Arguably, [they] are sometimes inclined to please corporate managers, who are in the
position to direct employees’ 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do not object
to the firm’s corporate governance practices. There is some evidence that business ties
make mutual funds vote in a more manager-friendly way, but the data are not entirely
unambiguous.
Gelter, supra note 22, at 960–61.
99. “[I]t would be passing strange if corporate law scholars truly believed that professional
money managers would, as a class, be less likely to exploit their agency than the managers of
corporations that make products and deliver services.” Strine, supra note 45, at 11; see also id. at
13 (“Instead, the equity holders of public corporations represent a new and powerful form of
agency, which presents its own risks to both individual investors and more generally to the best
interests of our nation.”). Fisch, supra note 33, at 882 (“An additional layer of agency costs occurs
within the intermediary. Those who make decisions on behalf of the intermediary, such as portfo-
lio managers and investment advisers, may act out of self-interest . . . .”). See also Choi, supra
note 94, at 52 (describing the self-interested motivations of intermediaries’ agents who take into
account their “own self-interest in making decisions”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail
Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1062 (2009)
(“[P]ortfolio managers are entirely rational and opportunistic, they will not maximize returns to
their investors if their personal incentives point in a different direction and marketplace discipline
is weak.”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 887 (Citing to the low number of institutional
investor initiated proxy proposals in the 2007-2009 seasons as evidence of institutional passivity).
100. Hedge funds, on the other hand, are an active version of intermediaries. Bebchuk, supra
note 35. An example of mutual fund passivity is found in delegated voting decisions to profes-
sional proxy voting services like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which empirically vote
in favor of the operating company’s management recommendations. See also Gilson & Gordon,
supra note 1, at 887 (citing to low proxy proposals); Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of
Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1430–31 (2002) (summarizing
academic studies concluding that mutual funds are passive investors); Gelter, supra note 22, at
961–62; Fisch, supra note 33, at 878–79, 881–83 (describing conflicts of interests between inves-
tors and intermediaries like mutual funds, low activism to reduce costs and serving employer-
sponsor, not individual investor interests). Cf. Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institu-
tional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG.
174, 177 (2001) (discussing shareholder activism and its effects on firm performance); Angela
Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN.
914, 920 (2011) (describing mutual fund opposition to management proposals on corporate gov-
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There are two reasons why investment companies with expertise, access to
information, and relative voting power would be passive.101 The first reason
is one of free riding. Mutual funds hold “stock in myriad companies” and
therefore lack the incentive to expend research costs in determining which
votes in which particular companies would most increase value.102 Spend-
ing resources to engage in activism is also less desirable when the fruits of
improved corporate governance and performance would be enjoyed by all
shareholders, including other competitive funds, not just the stock held by
the acting fund.103 Thus, the free rider problem discourages mutual funds
from bearing costs of shareholder activism when they cannot secure the sole
benefit for those efforts.104 Similarly, the hope that other investment com-
panies may incur the costs and take a leadership role is also a powerful
disincentive.105 Not just the fear of others free riding but the hope to free
ride on the efforts of other shareholders weighs logically against intermedi-
ary activism.
Free riding does not capture the full force of the disincentive, which
may be more accurately described as herding or the desire to not be an
outlier.106 In mutual fund markets, performance is primarily relative, not
absolute. The goal is to perform better than competitors, which is different
from performing the best. Institutional investors often employ similar in-
vestment strategies, which erode incentives for activism.107
The second reason for passive voting power is closely related to exit
rights of retail investors. High liquidity in the form of easily redeemed in-
vestments means that investors can flee in the face of poor performance
relative to other funds, even if that poor performance is temporary.108 To
the extent that investors monitor, they track relative performance and chase
positive past returns.109 Focusing on short-term returns means that in-
termediaries will likely exit a poorly performing operating company invest-
ernance like poison pills, staggered boards and minority elections). INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
SERVICES, http://www.issgovernance.com/about (last visited May 28, 2013).
101. Under the heading of intermediary investors there are the passive mutual and index fund
investors as well as active hedge funds. Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 1673–76 (discussing empirical
support for target’s positive stock price at the forty-day, two-year, and five-year marks).
102. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1830–31.
103. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 889–90 (describing the unique agency cost as a prefer-
ence for relative competitive performance not absolute performance).
104. Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the US, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW?, 55 (Geoffrey Owen et
al., eds., 2006); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 270 (2012).
105. Fisch, supra note 33, at 879.
106. See, e.g., Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J.
FIN. 581 (1999).
107. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 891–94 (describing activism disincentives in part
because of relative performance benchmarks).
108. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1830–31.
109. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 893.
2013] THE OUTSIDE INVESTOR 121
ment rather than invest time and money resources in active monitoring and
participation.110 Mutual fund managers are thus tied to short-term returns
and quarterly statements in order to retain current investors and attract new
investors.111 Because mutual fund managers’ performance evaluations and
compensation models are also tied to quarterly and annual performance,
there is additional incentive for the mutual fund manager to exit the operat-
ing company rather than engage in activism.112
C. Confounding Effects of Citizen Shareholder Status: The Ultimate
Outsider
This Article is not focused on indirect owners in general; rather, the
spotlight is on a subset of indirect owners—citizen shareholders. Citizen
shareholders’ unique investment circumstances insert additional in-
termediaries into the investment chain, exerting pressure on the representa-
tive function of mutual funds as evidenced by not-my-client and time
horizon conflicts. Citizen shareholders present a puzzle because the pres-
ence and prevalence of these investors fueled shareholder empowerment
trends in corporate governance, yet the interests of these same shareholders
are easily discarded.
1. Not My Client: Conflicts of Interest
As stated, citizen shareholders enter securities markets through self-
directed, employer-sponsored, defined-contribution plans and are subject to
unique conflicts of interest as a result of additional intermediaries inserted
into the investment chain. For example, the employer-sponsor of the de-
fined-contribution plan often acts as the consumer of funds included in a
defined-contribution plan. In this position, the employer or plan administra-
tor interacts with the fund and determines whether or not the fund will have
110. See id. (describing incentives for exit over activism); Fisch, supra note 33, at 878–79,
881–83 (describing conflicts of interests between investors and intermediaries like mutual funds,
low activism to reduce costs, and serving employer-sponsor, not individual, investor interests).
See also Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1830–31 (“Mutual fund managers thus feel intense pressure
to maximize short-term returns in order to attract and retain investors.”).
111. “[I]nstitutional stockholders assess the performance of the investment managers who
control their stock portfolios over a short time frame, typically quarter to quarter or year to year,
on the basis of the change in the portfolio’s market value during the specified time period.” Martin
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial
Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 206 (1991). See also Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient
Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1650
(2011) (“[I]nstitutional investors are managed by persons or firms whose compensation depends
on generating short-term returns from the portfolio company shares under fund management.”).
112. Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advo-
cate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 867–75 (2009) (describing in detail conflicts of
interests between managers and indirect owners); see also Dallas, supra note 104, at 272 (describ-
ing managers’ tactics to increase compensation, bonuses, and performance evaluations based upon
short-term performance which may create detrimental long-term effects within the fund and the
invested in companies).
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access to the employee participants. From the mutual fund perspective, ac-
cess to the pool of retirement investors will increase assets under manage-
ment, a crucial determinant in compensation.113 As a result, employer-
sponsors can be viewed as the client of the intermediary mutual fund, rather
than the individual participants, and employer-sponsor interests can be pri-
oritized over the interests of the individual participants.114 For example,
poor fund performance is often reacted to at the employer-sponsor level, not
the individual citizen shareholder level, meaning that a sponsor will elimi-
nate a fund as an investment option and reallocate participants into the sub-
stitute fund.115
Another way these conflicts of interests play out is in fee arrange-
ments. A common third-party payment practice, known as revenue sharing,
creates the potential for conflicts of interest in selecting funds that are in-
cluded in the 401(k) plan.116 Revenue sharing117 occurs when a portion of
fees charged on the mutual fund options are used to fund the administration
of the plan and offset the employer-sponsor’s administrative costs associ-
ated with the plan. Under a revenue sharing arrangement in defined-contri-
bution plans, higher plan fees “reduce or effectively eliminate the plan
[employer’s] own costs in offering a 401(k) plan . . . .”118 The extra fees
charged to citizen shareholders to offset plan administration by the client
erode investment returns and impact overall retirement savings and illus-
trate a serious conflict of interest.119 Revenue sharing practices add opacity
to the fees charged to citizen shareholders, leading them to believe that their
costs are lower than may actually be charged or are competitive with retail
investors.120
113. Id. (describing the potential for compensation to “influence the plan provider’s selection
of investment alternatives.”).
114. “[T]he [mutual fund] industry’s true customers are not individual investors, but rather
portfolio companies that can decide how to allocate their employee-thrift business.” James Cotter
et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9
(2010).
115. “In 2012, 47 percent of plan sponsors indicated that they had replaced a fund in the last
year because of poor performance.” Collins et al., supra note 9, at 11.
116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 401(K) PLANS: IMPROVED REGULATION COULD
BETTER PROTECT PARTICIPANTS FROM CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 16 (Jan. 2011), available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/320/315363.pdf.
117. “Revenue sharing, in the pension plan industry, generally refers to indirect payments
made from one service provider, such as the investment fund provider, to another service provider
in connection with services provided to the plan, rather than payments made directly by the plan
sponsor for plan services.” Id.
118. Stephen D. Rosenberg, Retreat from the High Water Mark: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claims Involving Excessive Fees After Tibble v. Edison International, 18 J. PENSION BENEFITS 12,
13 (2011).
119. Asset weight-adjusted average 401(k) expense ratios for 2012 were sixty-three basis
points compared to the weighted average of all mutual funds was seventy-seven basis points.
Collins et al., supra note 9, at 11.
120. Fisch, supra note 4, at 2005. (“First, the hidden nature of the payments may mislead
participants to believe that their investment costs are lower than they actually are.”).
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Asset weight adjusted average 401(k) expense ratios for 2012 were
sixty-three basis points compared to the weighted average of all mutual
funds was seventy-seven basis points.121 These numbers do not tell the
complete story. The expense ratio does not reflect the total cost of invest-
ment through defined-contribution plans. One study attempted to quantify
the all-in fee associated with 401(k) investment and established an average
fee of seventy-eight basis points (based on 2009 data).122 The reported “all-
in” fee suggests that there is no savings, but perhaps a cost to investment in
the 401(k) format, despite the economies of scale and decreased marketing
expenses that should lower fund fees for 401(k) participants.123 Addition-
ally, all numbers reported reflect the average, which is susceptible to skew-
ing by high or low outliers making the average appear different from the
most frequently occurring fees. Finally, that some plans may offer lower
average fees does not eliminate the not-my-client conflict. Employers may
still choose between two plans, the one that offers the greatest potential for
revenue sharing even if the cost of that choice keeps the fees within the
averages.
Neither the employer-sponsor nor the fund negotiates with the citizen
shareholder, nor do they view the citizen shareholder as the client. The se-
curities consumer, the citizen shareholder, is left out of the equation but
remains responsible for the cost. Here the addition of the employer-sponsor
and plan administration into the investment chain exerts pressure on a tradi-
tional check and balance of market transactions and alignment of interests
that is unique to citizen shareholders. Fees are discussed in greater detail in
Section V(E).
2. Investment-Time-Horizon Conflicts of Interest
Investment-time-horizon conflicts illustrate a central problem with
shareholder accountability procedures, which empower intermediary invest-
ment companies. As defined, citizen shareholders use these funds to save
for retirement and other long-term goals such as college education savings
for children.124 The investment-time-horizon conflict may be the same for
other indirect investors, especially in light of studies where mutual fund
121. Collins et al., supra note 9, at 11.
122. DELOITTE, ICI, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN FEES: A
STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE 8 (2011), available at http://www.ici.org/
pdf/rpt_11_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Strine, supra note 45, at 6 (describing the investment-time-horizon conflict between re-
tirement investors and institutional managers); see also Jacobs, supra note 111, at 1662 (“The
fundamental problem is that the institutional investor community no longer thinks like the end-
user investors that they serve. The end-user investors (i.e., you and I) want our investments to
grow for the long-term to fund our children’s college educations and our retirement. But, the
institutional investors who manage our retirement plans and other investments are interested
mainly in the short-term.”).
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investors self-report that they invest, in part, for retirement savings.125 This
Article makes a distinction between optional savings outside of dedicated
retirement accounts and retirement savings in self-directed defined-contri-
bution plans with stated objectives of retirement savings and regulations,
like withdrawal penalties,126 that structurally reinforce the long-term time
horizon of citizen shareholders. Of course, as an investor nears retirement
age, the time horizon appears to shrink. However, upon reaching retirement
age, the assets are paid (more accurately, rolled over) from an ERISA-gov-
erned plan into a private securities account where the now-retired employee
continues to manage the assets through retirement until death.127 Reaching
retirement age is not the end of the time horizon, but marks a change in
legal protections attached to the investments.
Despite citizen shareholders’ long-term investment interests, many in-
termediaries utilize easy exit remedies and invest with a short-term time
horizon tied to quarterly and annual returns.128 The following discussion
outlines the empirical support for the conclusion that managed funds have
short-term investment time horizons, as well as highlights the specific
problems this raises for citizen shareholders.129
Mutual funds are actively managed investment companies attempting
to deliver investment returns above average market returns. Funds try to
beat average market returns by identifying and investing in stocks that are
125. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 51, at 132.
126. Aside from the stated purpose of defined-contribution plans as retirement benefits, assets
invested in these plans are subject to early withdrawal penalties if funds are removed before age
59 1/2. See IRS, Topic 424-401(k) Plans, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc424.html (last visited May
7, 2014).
127. See SEC, Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and Rebalancing, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 2009), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm; see
also Anne M. Tucker, Retirement Revolution, supra note 15, at 192–94 (describing asset manage-
ment after retirement); IRS, supra note 126 (discussing roll overs for 401(k) accounts).
128. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 35 (debunking corporate board isolationist supporters
on the theory that short-termism fears are overstated in both their prevalence and effect).
129. Short-termism is described as “taking of actions that result in a short-term gain, but
which sacrifice the long-term benefit of the firm to a suboptimal degree.” Rodrigues, supra note 8,
at 1823. For a brief discussion on the view that institutional investors are activist and long-term
investors, see Sharon Hannes, Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J.
CORP. L. 51, 74–75 (2004).
[N]ot only did institutional investors grow in size, they also changed their habits and
became active players on the market in the late 1980s. The rise in institutional activism
coincided with a change in the investment strategies of institutional investors. Tradition-
ally, institutions expressed dissatisfaction with firm management by taking the “Wall
Street Walk” and selling their shares. However, with the increased concentration of
equity in institutional hands, this exit strategy became difficult to employ. Conse-
quently, institutions became long-term investors, a position that heightened interest in
their monitoring role.
Id.; see also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 111, at 206–07 (“The investment manager trying to
outperform the market average in each quarter or each year will always have an incentive to
accept even seek, a short-term premium for a portfolio stock.”).
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undervalued or appreciating faster than average.130 They attempt to do this,
in part, by monitoring and capitalizing on temporary fluctuations in the
market as a whole and in individual stocks to achieve their earnings goals.
Asset managers [i.e., mutual funds] make their money by identi-
fying instances of mispricing. They assume dual risks: the risk
that the fundamental value of the asset they purchase may fall
before the market eliminates the mispricing (fundamental risk)
and the risk that the mispricing may get worse before the market
eliminates it at a point when the trade must be liquidated (noise
trader risk).131
General market and individual stock fluctuations are easier to capture
in the short-term, rather than with long-term horizons, for two reasons.
First, the opportunity for a fundamental risk and noise trader risk increases
with the length of the time horizon.132 This simply means that, over time,
there is a greater likelihood that a bad event will occur (fundamental risk) or
that there will be imperfect information and market incomprehension of all
risks for a particular asset (noise)—both of which affect asset pricing.133
Second, a high turnover rate more quickly builds a record of asset manage-
ment success than does a few long-term trades.134 The average holding peri-
ods for mutual fund shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
130. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1830 (“Actively managed mutual funds attempt to beat the
market by investing in stocks that appreciate faster than average.”).
131. Dallas, supra note 104, at 295. See also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 111, at 208–09
(citing to cognitive psychology literature establishing that stockholders overweigh current infor-
mation creating an artificial “discount rate for future earnings estimates” and undervaluing long-
term investments and assets).
132. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and
Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 149–50 (1990) (describing fundamental and noise trading risks);
Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cau-
tious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 261, 268 (1989) (describing
noise traders as those who trade on information, like consumer confidence and predictions about
consumer behaviors rather than estimates based upon the fundamental values of the assets held by
the company).
133. If, for example, an asset is underpriced relative to its fundamental value, and a
smart investor buys it, he has to bear the risk that before mispricing is eliminated or
reduced the fundamental value actually falls. In this case, his . . . trade results in a loss
even though it was ex ante attractive. In addition to fundamental risk, the smart investor
bears the risk that the mispricing gets worse before it is eliminated, called “noise trader
risk”. . . .Both fundamental and noise trader risk are more important for assets where the
elimination of underpricing take longer, since there is more time for bad news or a wave
of pessimism to hit. These risks raise the cost of arbitraging long-term assets relative to
short-term assets.
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 132, at 149. See generally Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FINANCE,
Issue 3, 529–43 (1986) (providing a comprehensive discussion on noise trading).
134. Dallas, supra note 104, at 296. Additional evidence of short-term time horizons can be
found in increased volume in trading on the stock exchanges, where for example, the average
daily share trading volume in the NYSE-listed stock increased 181 percent from 2.1 billion shares
to 5.9 billion shares from 2005 to 2009. Id. at 296–97 (attributing the rise in trading volume, in
part, to the technological platform of trading as well as the decline in per-trade transaction costs
thus facilitating short-term trading). Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 35, at 1661 (discrediting the conclu-
sion of pervasive short-termism as a result of increased trading volumes).
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have significantly decreased from a five-year average to a less than one-
year average.135 “At actively managed mutual funds, which constitute the
primary investor of American 401(k) retirement funds, the annual turnover
is about 100%.”136 Averages can be skewed by high and low outliers that
can pull the mean score in either direction, but, that criticism notwithstand-
ing, a 2010 study by the Investor Responsibility Research Institute found
that “nearly two-thirds of portfolio managers have higher annual portfolio
turnover than claimed, some by as much as 200 percent.”137
The short-term time horizon of intermediary investment companies,
like mutual funds, contributes to short-term focus at the operating company
level as well because “outside investors and analysts typically rely on cur-
rent-period earnings when forming their expectations on future earn-
ings.”138 For example, operating companies with mutual fund investors are
more likely to engage in earnings management.139 Accrual-based earnings
management “manipulate[s] reported earnings through discretionary accrual
choices that are allowed under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP)” and “typically occurs toward the end of an accounting period
once most real operating activities are completed.”140 The Enron and the
WorldCom scandals are the most notorious examples of earnings manage-
ment where companies manipulated accounting and financial statements to
hide debt, losses, and poorly performing assets.141
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,142 a direct re-
sponse to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, companies are more likely to
engage in real earnings management, which is not solely an accounting
While insulation advocates point to the increase in the volume of trading over time, this
increase might be driven by an increase in high-frequency trading by a minority of
investors and not reflect shortened horizons for most institutional investors. Indeed, re-
cent empirical work suggests that the holding duration of institutional investors has been
stable over the past quarter of century and, if anything, slightly lengthened over time.
Id.
135. James Hawley et al., supra note 43, at 5.
136. Jacobs, supra note 111, at 1651. See also Anabtawi, supra note 30, at 579; NYSE, Report
of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance 12–13 (2010), available
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf.
137. Hawley et al., supra note 43, at 5.
138. Jeong-Bon Kim & Byungcherl Charlie Sohn, Real Versus Accrual-Based Earnings Man-
agement and Implied Cost of Equity Capital 2 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1297938.
139. See Dawn A. Mastumoto, Management’s Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Sur-
prises, 77 ACCT. REV. 483, 507 (2002) (finding a relationship between shares held by intermedi-
ary investors and earnings management by the company to minimize negative forecasts and boost
earnings reports).
140. Kim & Sohn, supra note 138, at 2.
141. Matiur Rahman et al., Accounting Scandals and Stock Performance: Life After Enron, 7
J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 13, 13–22 (2009) (describing the Enron and other accounting scandals using
accrual earnings management), available at http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JBER/arti
cle/viewFile/2266/2314; see also Dallas, supra note 104, at 278.
142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 245 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.).
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trick to manipulate financial statements, but deals with expense and asset
decisions made for the purpose of affecting short-term gains.143 For exam-
ple, real earnings management alters “the timing and scale of real activities
such as production, sales, investment, and financing activities throughout
the accounting period in such a way that a specific earnings target can be
met.”144
Real earnings management poses a threat to operating companies be-
cause, unlike with accrual earnings management, it can directly impact cur-
rent and future cash flows.145 Additionally, real earnings management is
more difficult to detect and is less strictly monitored by internal auditing
committees, regulatory agencies, and analysts.146
Intermediary investment companies’ short term time horizons can
drive short termism at the operating company level, which intensifies the
investment-time-horizon conflict with citizen shareholders. Shareholder
empowerment reforms “ignore[ ] the fact that the immediate shareholders of
the vast majority of publicly traded corporations have short-term investment
horizons” and may exercise their enhanced voting rights with a view to-
wards short-term interests even when doing so on behalf of long-term
investors.147
D. Citizen Shareholders’ Governance Rights Are Inadequate to
Neutralize Representation Concerns
Indirect shareholders, including citizen shareholders, have certain cor-
porate governance rights—such as access to information and voting—in the
intermediary investment companies in which they invest. Structural differ-
ences between the organization of operating companies and the organiza-
143. Jacobs, supra note 111, at 1650 (attributing the compensation arrangement of institu-
tional managers to exerting “significant pressure on corporate managements and boards to deploy
corporate assets and develop business strategies that will yield short-term profits, often at the
expense of the long-term.”). See also Dallas, supra note 104, at 278–81 (comparing earnings
management with real earnings management, describing the pervasiveness of the practices, and
describing the consequences for long-term investors by linking short-term practices with “signifi-
cant future negative returns for [short-term] firms”).
144. Kim & Sohn, supra note 138, at 2.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. In this study the authors sought to establish the harm of real earnings management
relative to accrual earning management by studying the cost of capital. Their study concluded that
real earnings management “distorts the role of earnings as an indicator of a firm’s true future cash
flows, and thus exacerbates information problems faced by outside investors to a greater extent
than does [accrual earnings management].” Id.
147. Hawley et al., supra note 43, at 5 (“[S]hort termism is being fostered through the adop-
tion of regulatory frameworks that constrain the ability of investors with long-term liabilities to
use long-term investment strategies.”); see also Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1823–24, 1829
(“[S]hareholder empowerment cannot solve the problem of managerial myopia if it is only the
short-term intermediary (e.g., the mutual fund, the hedge fund, or the pension fund) that is em-
powered, and not the ultimate holder, who is investing for the long term.”).
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tion of investment companies, particularly mutual funds, dilute the
effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms.
Investment companies, like mutual funds, are regulated under a similar
structure of registration, disclosure, and voting requirements that govern op-
erating companies. Investment companies must register public offerings
under the Securities Act of 1933148 and the ICA.149 The ICA also requires
mutual funds to register with the SEC150 and “mandates extensive disclo-
sure, and . . . imposes . . . requirements and prohibitions [related to] capital
structure, the composition and structure of their boards of directors, the
types of transactions in which [mutual funds] can engage . . . and the diver-
sification of their investments among different industries.”151
Much of the regulatory framework of investment companies is
modeled on the operating company.152 Perhaps this is unsurprising as in-
vestment companies, like mutual funds, appear to be structured similarly to
operating companies with centralized control vested in boards of direc-
tors,153 the presence of shareholders, and accountability measures through
voting rights.154 The similarities, however, end with appearances.
148. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 80a-4 (2011); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1–270.60a-1
(2012); see also Investment Company Registration and Regulation Package, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/invcoreg121504.htm (last visited May 8,
2014).
149. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012).
150. Mutual funds are regulated under each of the four principal securities laws: the
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act), and the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (the ‘40 Act). Often described as the most complex of these
laws, the ‘40 Act was enacted specifically to regulate mutual funds and other types of
investment companies as well as the investment advisers who manage them.
Nagy, supra note 72, at 14–15; see also Investment Company Registration and Regulation Pack-
age, supra note 148.
151. Nagy, supra note 72, at 15. Registration with the SEC is the “hook for the substantive
regulation” of mutual funds. Markham, supra note 59, at 77.
152. “U.S. investment company regulation embodies a ‘corporate governance’ regulatory par-
adigm.” Anita Krug, supra note 75, at 266. “Although the economic power of institutional inves-
tors has grown enormously, corporate and securities laws continue to focus obsessively on
operating companies. This ignores the reality that most Americans invest in funds controlled by
institutional investors, rather than in operating companies.” Strine, supra note 45, at 29.
153. Corporate boards of directors have statutory authority to control the corporation. See,
e.g., Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729 (Del. 1988).  In many corpora-
tions, de facto control is exercised by the officers or management of the corporation. See, e.g.,
Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforc-
ing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 27, 28 (2010) (“Wielding considerable power
and influence over a corporation’s business and affairs, officers have replaced directors as the
individuals occupying the central role in corporate decision making. Senior executive officers, in
particular chief executive officers, have dominated corporate affairs, being referred to as ‘the
boss’ and ‘monarchs.’”).
154. Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 521, 553 (2009). For a detailed discussion on the evolution of investment companies and
the circumstances under which their regulatory frameworks were originally established, see Krug,
supra note 75, at 269–74; Markham, supra note 59, at 69–79.
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Regulations focus on the corporate structure of an investment com-
pany, even though the company, such as a mutual fund, is often a “shell”
that produces no products nor provides any services and has no employ-
ees.155 Investment companies are almost entirely reliant on the investment
adviser,156 yet the governance model is focused on a centralized board of
directors where liability, fiduciary duty, and disclosures are focused.157 The
role of the investment advisers and the limited control that a mutual fund
board of directors can exert over its advisers warps the power and accounta-
bility balances assumed in operating companies and replicated in invest-
ment companies.
The following is a discussion of criticisms of the mutual fund board
and importance of the governance framework in investment companies as
established by previous corporate law scholars. Some scholars discount the
empty signal of stewardship in investment company governance and rely
instead on the robust exit rights of indirect investors.158 The empty govern-
ance framework is particularly problematic for citizen shareholders, how-
ever, who have weakened exit rights and are in many ways locked in the
investments offered within their plan.159 In light of weakened exit rights
and locked in capital for citizen shareholders, the criticisms of inadequate
governance, as described below, take on heightened importance.
1. Decreased Power of the Mutual Fund Board
The cornerstone of the investment company governance structure is
the independent board of directors160 heralded to be the watchdog that is
155. “Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by their own employees. Most funds
are formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, [called ‘investment advisors’] that are
separately owned and operated.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480–81 (1979) (internal edits
omitted); see also Krug, supra note 75, at 265.
156. “The professional financial managers (or ‘advisers’) who actually run mutual funds’ day-
to-day operations are typically legally distinct from the funds. Funds formally contract with ad-
viser entities for management services, and the adviser entities employ individual portfolio man-
agers.” Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 92; see also Krug, supra note 75, at 273 (describing the
investment adviser as “not ‘internal’ to the investment company but, rather may be thought of as a
third-party service provider, and the terms of the relationship between the company and the ad-
viser are set forth in an investment-advisory contract.”); Schwartz, supra note 154, at 553.
(“Nearly all of the affairs of the fund are managed by its investment adviser, an outside company
with its own group of shareholders who demands profits from the firm’s management activities.”).
157. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (attaching liability
for false disclosures at the mutual fund level, not the investment adviser level).
158. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 102–05 (describing the robust exit rights of indirect
investors).
159. Employer matching contributions, if offered, are a part of the compensation package so
to opt out of defined-contribution plans would leave compensation on the table.  Additionally,
penalties for early withdrawal impact exit.  Finally, the constrained universe of plan investments
make “exit” rights for citizen shareholders relatively weak as compared to other indirect investors.
160. If the investment company is a corporation (like Fidelity), it has officers and directors,
but if it is organized as a business trust, it is governed by trustees. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTI-
130 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:1
monitoring investment advisers.161 The SEC stated in introductory remarks
regarding the 2004 director independence rules that:
Fund independent directors play a central role in policing the con-
flicts of interest that advisers inevitably have with the funds they
advise . . . the paramount principle that must prevail, and should
animate all decisions directors are called upon to make, is that a
fund must be managed on behalf of its investors rather than on
behalf of the adviser or other affiliated persons of the fund.162
Independence requirements focus on affiliations between the director and
the investment company, limiting ownership percentages of her or her im-
mediate family members in the fund and other forms of restricted transac-
tions.163 This “relational nexus”164 approach to independence, however,
does not preclude an investment company director from also serving as a
director for other funds managed by the investment adviser.165 “Indepen-
dent directors may become ‘house directors’ serving on the boards of many
funds within a fund family, and receive considerable compensation as a
result of maintaining friendly relations with a particular investment
adviser.”166
The aspirational role of the investment company board of directors
quickly gives way to the realities of how these boards are created and oper-
ate, as was illustrated in the 2011 Supreme Court case of Janus Capital
TUTE, supra note 51, at Appendix A. For purposes of this Article, I will use the term board of
directors to address the governance structure of investment companies in either situation.
161. Under the ICA, 75 percent of investment company directors must be independent. SEC,
Securities and Exchange Commission 17 C.F.R. Part 270, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, (July 27,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26520.htm; 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(7)(i) (2013). The ICA
was amended to increase the independence requirement in an effort to promote the “watch dog”
function of boards monitoring investment advisers. See A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual
Funds Be Corporations? A Legal & Econometric Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 748, 750 (2008).
See also Jones v. Harris, supra note 157, at 1427–28 (2010).
162. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT COMPANY GOVERNANCE, 17 C.F.R. pt. 270
(2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26520.htm.
163. Independence is established by demonstrating that a director is not an affiliated or inter-
ested person, meaning that she cannot own more than a 5 percent interest in the investment com-
pany, be a family member of a controlling person, be legal counsel, engage in restricted
transactions such as loans with the investment company, or have a material business or profes-
sional relationship with the investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2–3, 80a-19, 80a-20 (2012); see
also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INTERPRETIVE MATTERS CONCERNING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 17 C.F.R. pt. 271 (1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/in
terp/ic-24083.htm.
164. Warburton, supra note 161, at 748, 751 (describing the independence test as focusing on
the “relational nexus” between the investment company director and the investment company
adviser). Additionally, the relationship is fixed at the time that the board member is selected, and
does not change by reason of a sustained working relationship between the member and the in-
vestment adviser through their work with the fund. Id. at 751–52 (describing the initial distance of
the independent director as narrowing over time).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2010).
166. Warburton, supra note 161, at 748, 752 (2008).
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Group v. First Derivative Traders.167 Even in respecting the formal separa-
tion between the fund and the adviser for purposes of fraud liability,168 the
opinion highlighted the functional coordination and symbiotic relationship
between fund and adviser.169  Unlike boards of operating companies, which
hire key officers like the CEO,170 the equation is flipped in investment com-
panies, where the key employee (i.e., the investment adviser) selects the
board.171 The ICA requires directors of mutual funds to be elected when the
fund is first formed and this is usually done by the investment adviser who
elects the initial directors, often before the shares of the fund are sold publi-
cally.172 Thereafter, the directors are allowed to “serve indefinitely without
reelection and can appoint replacement board members without holding
shareholder votes” under many circumstances.173 In light of this “special
relationship” between the investment company’s board of directors and its
investment adviser, it is unsurprising that there are few examples where a
board has replaced a fund’s adviser.174 “[A] Mutual fund cannot, as a prac-
tical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of
arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the
same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.”175
167. 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299–300, 180 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2011).
The following arrangements are typical. A separate entity called an investment adviser
creates the mutual fund, which may have no employees of its own. The adviser selects
the fund’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and provides other services. Be-
cause of the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund
often “cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the
forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same
manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.”
Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
168. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) (hold-
ing that JCM, financial adviser, was not liable for false statements included in the prospectuses
made by Janus Investment Fund under Rule 10b-5).
169. Id. at 2299 (describing the creation of the fund by the parent corporation and the manage-
ment of the fund by the adviser, noting that all of the officers of the fund were the officers of the
adviser but that only one member of the fund’s board was associated with the adviser). Id. at 2312
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The relationship between Janus Management and the Fund could hardly
have been closer. Janus Management’s involvement in preparing and writing the relevant state-
ments could hardly have been greater. And there is a serious suggestion that the board itself knew
little or nothing about the falsity of what was said.”).
170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2012).
171. Jones, 559 U.S. at 338; see also Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 92.
172. Warburton, supra note 161, at 748–49, 752 (“[M]ost directors are initially selected by the
adviser.”).
173. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 94; see Bibb L. Strench, Board Structure and
Processes, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION § 14:3 (Clifford Kirsch ed., 2010); see also Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-16(a) (no terms for unclassified boards).
174. Warburton, supra note 161, at 752 n.27 (citing to four instances where an investment
company board of directors replaced its investment adviser, including when the Korea Fund re-
placed its adviser Deutsche Asset Management in 2007, and the Japan Fund replaced Deutsche
Asset Management in 2006).
175. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979); Jones, 559 U.S. at 338 (quoting Burks).
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Additional structural constraints arise from the board’s lack of relative
power over investment advisers.176 In investment companies where the bus-
iness of the firm is investing, investment policy is corporate policy. An
investment adviser, not the board, provides essentially all of the operational
components of the fund as well as sets and implements its investment strat-
egy.177 Without the adviser there is no fund function and this reality “im-
poses a critical limit on a director’s ability to act as an effective
fiduciary.”178 Because the investment company board is stripped of effec-
tive management control over the virtually nonexistent fund employees and
has no ability to set corporate policy, it is no longer analogous to an operat-
ing company’s board of directors, which hires and fires officers and sets
corporate policy.179 Additionally, critics argue that investment company
boards have limited resources and are dependent upon the investment ad-
viser for information about the fund, thus stripping them of information and
expertise necessary to perform the monitoring function well.180
Importing operating company corporate governance solutions to in-
vestment intermediaries fails to recognize the structural differences between
the two corporate models. The differences in the investment company con-
text erode the board of directors’ balancing powers, which impacts citizen
shareholders who are relatively locked in as compared to other indirect
investors.
2. Weakened Shareholder Voting in Investment Companies
Compounds Governance Constraints
Similarly, the documented weakened role of shareholder voting in in-
vestment companies—due to rational apathy and robust exit rights of other
indirect investors—impacts citizen shareholders as compared to other in-
176. Mutual funds are “but a means, or a mechanism, through which the investment adviser
provides its services, and . . . is under the adviser’s control.” Anita Krug, Escaping Entity-Centr-
ism in Financial Services Regulation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2061–62 (2013). The investment
adviser uses the fund to provide its services to investors in the fund. In order to do so, the adviser
often creates the fund, and is “primarily responsible for selecting not only the fund’s service
providers . . . but also the members of the fund’s initial board of directors” and the adviser’s
employees staff the fund. Id. at 2062; see Fisch, supra note 4, at 2010–12.
177. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (“Janus Invest-
ment Fund has no assets apart from those owned by the investors. JCM provides Janus Investment
Fund with investment advisory services, which include ‘the management and administrative ser-
vices necessary for the operation of [Janus] Fun[d]’. . . .”). See also Schwartz, supra note 154, at
556 (“[T]here is no role for the board to play as policy-setter.”). Compare with the boards of
directors in operating companies that generally provide monitoring and strategic planning exper-
tise. Warburton, supra note 161, at 751.
178. Fisch, supra note 4, at 2011. See also Krug, supra note 75, at 275–79 (describing corpo-
rate governance standards as setting a “default legal framework for structuring private relation-
ships” and documenting its failures in the investment company context).
179. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 154, at 556–57.
180. Warburton, supra note 161, at 751 (“If directors do not possess full information or exper-
tise, critics argue that it is not realistic to expect them to strike the best deal for investors.”).
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vestors. While shareholder voting rights in operating companies are often
eroded by the rational apathy of small and diffuse shareholders necessitat-
ing the proxy process in order to achieve voting quorums,181 those con-
straints are magnified with respect to indirect investors in mutual funds,
particularly citizen shareholders. Mutual funds have even lower investor
participation rates than operating companies, so management routinely must
engage in costly re-solicitation of proxies when required because of insuffi-
cient responses to achieve a quorum.182 As a result, initial advisory con-
tracts and fee charges are approved at the formation of the fund with built in
room for discretion and possible fee increases to avoid future shareholder
votes.183 Many mutual funds do not hold regular annual meetings, absent a
required vote, which “highlights the insignificance of [mutual fund] share-
holder voting rights.”184 Because few investors participate in mutual fund
votes, the votes that do occur are largely controlled by management, who
are strongly linked to the advisers.185
When is a shareholder vote required in mutual funds? Shareholders
must approve significant changes in a fund’s investment objectives.186
There is an implicit incentive, therefore, for mutual funds to write vague
investment objectives with built in discretion for change to avoid future
shareholder votes.187 Additionally, investment objectives shape asset allo-
cation by fund managers. When these policies are intentionally written with
ambiguity and discretion to avoid shareholder votes, they undermine the
disclosure process and hinder risk assessment.
Additionally, shareholder voting in mutual funds is complicated by
exit remedies for retail investors in which redemption value of mutual fund
shares make exiting a dominant strategy over voting and other corporate
181. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 558.
182. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 115–16.
183. Id. at 93 (“In practice, advisers avoid shareholder votes on advisory contacts at the time
funds are started by distributing all of a fund’s initial shares to affiliates of the advisers and then
holding a vote on the contract before any shares have been sold to the public. The ICA then allows
initial contracts and board members’ teams to be extended indefinitely without shareholder votes
so long as independent directors vote annually to approve the contracts.”).
184. Fisch, supra note 4, at 2014–15.
185. Affiliates of the advisers often select the initial board of director members. Initial direc-
tors are often elected in an initial vote when the fund’s shares are distributed to “affiliates of the
advisers” who vote “before any shares have been sold to the public” and those directors can serve
indefinitely. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 93–94. See also id. at 118 (“There is very little
evidence of [mutual fund] boards challenging fund managers over any significant issue.”). See
also Knute Salhus & Jeffries Oliver-Li, SEC Approves Elimination of Broker Discretionary Vot-
ing in Uncontested Elections of Directors, WILMERHALE.COM (July 2, 2009), http://www.wilmer
hale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=93237 (citing to the increased con-
trol that will be exercised by institutional investors such as mutual funds as a result of eliminating
discretionary broker voting in uncontested investment company election of directors).
186. See Investment Company Act of 1940: 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(1)–(4) for specific changes
requiring approval by shareholder vote.
187. Fisch, supra note 4, at 2020.
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governance remedies (i.e., proxy fights).188 “Shareholder activism, how-
ever, is unheard of in the mutual-fund arena. The shareholders have techni-
cal authority over the board members, but in reality, it is the management
company that is attuned to their performance.”189 The corporate governance
style of investment company organization and regulation sends “the signal
of stewardship to the investing community without actually delivering
it.”190 Indirect shareholders are excluded from the corporate power account-
ability equation, yet still bear the financial risks of market performance. The
implications of weakened voting rights are theoretically neutralized when
investors have robust exit rights but remain problematic for relatively
locked-in investors such as citizen shareholders.
E. Market Forces & Fees
A central component of my argument that citizen shareholders are dis-
tinguishable from other investors is the significance of the number of in-
termediaries in the investment chain who exert pressure on the governance
system and extract fees from citizen shareholders. As discussed above, not-
my-client conflicts can increase the fees paid by citizen shareholders as a
way to offset employer sponsor costs. The following is a discussion about
such investment fees and fee disclosures, first generally and then specifi-
cally as to how those investment fees and fee disclosures affect citizen
shareholders.
1. Mutual Fund Fee Components
Investors pay ongoing fees associated with their investment as well as
potential one-time event fees (when the assets are purchased, transferred, or
sold).191 The ongoing fees include operating expenses like adviser fees and
administrative fees paid out of net assets.192 Ongoing fees also include 12b-
1 fees for distribution and marketing as well as some legal and administra-
tive fees.193 The ongoing fees are indirectly paid by investors and are re-
flected in the expense ratio, which is an expression of the overall fees
compared to the assets under management.194 Additional hidden fees may
be associated with the fund operations through SEC Rule 28(e) soft dollar
188. Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 121–22 (describing the phenomenon in mutual funds
as the “selection effect,” where investors who think fund performance is poor will exit rather than
vote).
189. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 558.
190. Id. at 560.
191. See Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/mffees.htm (last visited May 8, 2014).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., 12b-1 Fees, MORNINGSTAR INVESTING GLOSSARY, http://www.morningstar
.com/InvGlossary/Glossary.aspx?term=12b-1_fee (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
194. Collins et al., supra note 9, at 4.
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fees195 and sub-transfer agent fees, which are charged to funds, but not al-
ways reflected in expense ratios.196  Revenue sharing practices, mentioned
above, can include both expenses reflected in expense ratios and those fall-
ing outside of the scope.
2. Extended Investment Chain for Citizen Shareholders
Citizen shareholders’ investment through self-directed defined-contri-
bution plans inserts additional intermediaries like the employer-sponsor and
the plan administrators into the investment chain, which can add a layer of
costs.197 The typical 401(k) plan requires administrative, participant-fo-
cused, and regulatory compliance services.198 Administrative services in-
clude recordkeeping, transaction processing and plan creation, amendments,
and termination.199 Participant-focused services for equity investment in-
clude communications, possibly education services, investment manage-
ment, brokerage window (if offered), and possibly an employer stock
fund.200 Regulatory compliance services include plan document services,
consulting, accounting and audit services, legal compliance, plan testing,
and processing orders.201 Fees for these services can be “assessed per plan,
per participant, or per dollar invested (asset based fees).”202 Fees for these
services can be paid by participants (either individually or through a fee
charged to the plan) or the employer-sponsor.203 Many of the recordkeeping
and administrative fees can be paid through asset based expenses that are
subject to revenue sharing practices discussed above.204
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2010). “Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act establishes a safe harbor
that allows money managers to use client funds to purchase ‘brokerage and research services’ for
their managed accounts under certain circumstances without breaching their fiduciary duties to
clients.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Prac-
tices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2006), avail-
able at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2006/34-54165.pdf.
196. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-328, Defined Contribution Plans: Ap-
proaches in Other  Countries Offer Beneficial Strategies in Several Areas 31 (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589541.pdf.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2008); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
198. DELOITTE, supra note 122. Collins et al., supra note 9.
199. Collins et al., supra note 9, at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 5 (“The DOL requires that the plan sponsor pay the costs associated with the initial
design of the plan, as well as any design changes. Beyond these design services, employers can
share the costs of the plan services with their employees. However, many employers voluntarily
cover some or all plan related costs that legally could be shouldered by the plan participants. Any
costs not paid by the employer, which may include administrative, investment, legal, and compli-
ance costs are effectively paid by plan participants.”).
204. “Some or all of [the] recordkeeping or administrative fees also can be paid through a
portion of the asset-based investment expenses (e.g., in the form of 12b-1 fees, shareholder servic-
ing fees or administrative servicing fees), which is often referred to as revenue-sharing.” DEL-
LOITE, supra note 122, at 6.
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Retirement investing through benefit plans positively promotes retire-
ment savings, but also inserts additional intermediaries that exert pressure
on the governance framework and extract costs from citizen shareholders.
3. Fee Standards
A key function that the investment company board could play, but
does not, is in negotiating the advisory contracts and the fees awarded to the
investment adviser. The investment adviser is in a conflicted position with a
duty to serve the fund hiring it and a duty to its own shareholders to in-
crease profits by generating fees to be paid by the fund.205 The inherent
conflict heightens the potential oversight role that the investment company
board could exert over the adviser. Investment company boards, however,
rarely negotiate advisory contracts—it “happen[s] in only 10% of
funds”206—creating a “consistent and disturbing story of the failure of fund
boards to negotiate lower fees in the face of economies of scale generated
by rising fund assets and enhanced computer and telecommunications
technologies.”207
Fiduciary standards imposed by the ICA208 prohibit advisers from
charging fees “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of
arm’s length bargaining.”209 This broad standard effectively puts compen-
sation outside of the review of the court in deference to the scrutiny of the
advisers’ fees provided by the independent board, despite clear evidence
that such scrutiny often comes in the form of a rubber stamp.210 As such,
adviser fees are not subject to comparisons between different funds, such as
a retail mutual fund, and an option in a benefit plan.211 The Supreme Court
in Harris cautioned that, “courts should be mindful that the Act does not
205. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 557; Warburton, supra note 161, at 748–50.
206. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourc-
ing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 190–91 (2006).
207. Id. at 189–90; see also Schwartz, supra note 154, at 559.
208. ERISA imposes duties on fiduciaries such as loyalty, prudence, and obedience.  ERISA
§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).
209. Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 344 (2010) (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill
Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (describing a
breach of fiduciary duty).
210. Under the Act, “scrutiny of investment adviser compensation by a fully informed mutual
fund board is the cornerstone of the . . . effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.
The Act interposes disinterested directors as ‘independent watchdogs’ of the relationship between
a mutual fund and its adviser.” Jones, 559 U.S. at 348 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Deference to the board is context dependent and requires a process of board review. Id. at 349.
[W]here the board’s process was deficient or the adviser withheld important informa-
tion, the court must take a more rigorous look at the outcome. When an investment
adviser fails to disclose material information to the board, greater scrutiny is justified
because the withheld information might have hampered the board’s ability to function as
“an independent check upon the management.”
Id. at 351–52.
211. Id. at 349–50.
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necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds and institutional
clients.”212
4. Fee Competition
A discussion of investment company fees is not complete without
mentioning existing research critiquing the competitiveness of such fees.
Criticisms that the mutual fund market is inefficient point to the wide vari-
ety of fees213 charged for substantially similar services and information
asymmetries among securities consumers facilitating the persistence of high
fees despite the detrimental impact of returns.214 “Even within a particular
investment objective, fund expense ratios can vary considerably. For exam-
ple, ten percent of aggressive growth equity funds have expense ratios of
eighty-five basis points or less, while ten percent have expense ratios of 219
basis points or more.”215
Market competition, especially in light of retail investors’ robust exit
rights, should correct inefficiencies and regulate fees, but it does not.216 The
large number of funds in the market and the relatively low barriers to entry
should also encourage robust market-based regulation, but do not.217 One
suggested explanation for competition failure is that price competition oc-
curs in fee waivers, and not in the stated fees charged218 (think of a member
212. Id. at 350.
213. The SEC estimates that mutual fund expense ratios have risen from an average of
1.14% in 1979 to 1.36% in 1999. One study calculates that average expense ratios for
U.S. funds increased from 0.96% in 1971 to 1.44% in 1990. Another study claims that
expense ratios have, on average, doubled over four decades. Critics note that this escala-
tion in expense ratios has occurred simultaneously with the growth of the fund industry,
which should permit large economies of scale and hence declining expense ratios for
investors.
Warburton, supra note 161, at 753.
214. See, e.g., Lori Walsh, The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1 Plans: An
Examination of Fund Flows, Expenses and Returns 18 (working paper), available at http://www
.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf (“Furthermore, these higher expenses do not
translate into higher gross returns. Indeed, fund flows may be more volatile and gross returns may
be lower for funds with 12b-1 plans. These results highlight the significance of the conflict of
interest that 12b-1 plans create. Fund advisers use shareholder money to pay for asset growth from
which the adviser is the primary beneficiary through the collection of higher fees.”).
215. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 51. Expense ratios may be expressed in
basis points. A basis point is one, one-hundredth of one percent, which is expressed as 0.01%. An
expense ratio of eighty-five basis points is 0.85%, and an expense ratio of 219 basis points is
2.19%.
216. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Enabling Mutual Fund Arbitrage: Short Redemp-
tions and Improved Performance Guarantees (working paper), available at http://islandia.law.yale
.edu/ayres/Improved%20Performance%20Guarantee%203-26.pdf.
217. John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evi-
dence and Implications for Policy, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 151, 167–70 (2007) (discussing low
market barriers in the mutual fund industry).
218. “[F]unds . . . frequently offer to waive some of those fees. One study finds that almost
half of money market fund expenses were being waived, and that 37% of equity funds were
offering fee waivers. Moreover the study found that these fee waivers changed frequently through-
out the year.” Warburton, supra note 161, at 755.
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of a chain grocery store paying a reduced “member” price over the stated
retail price for non-members). Another explanation is that many investors
do not actively monitor their investments or the mutual fund market219 and,
as a result, “fail to respond to chronic poor performance by withdrawing
their funds, allowing some of the worst performing mutual funds to
survive.”220
Information asymmetries and financial illiteracy can also account for
some of the market inefficiencies.221 “[Investors] are systematically disad-
vantaged [because] the costs of obtaining accurate, relevant, intelligible,
and personally usable information about the risks of alternative investments
in financial intermediaries is excessively high . . . in relation to the amounts
to be invested.”222
In the context of citizen shareholders, consider a 2007 study conducted
by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) finding that “many em-
ployees don’t know how much they pay in fees, and that much of the fee
information they get from their employers is ‘piecemeal.’”223 Perhaps this
ignorance is rational, or at least understandable, given the instant diversifi-
cation of mutual fund investing and that these investors effectively “hire”
the mutual fund to manage and monitor performance and fees.224
219. “Those who do compete for retail investor money may find themselves with ambiguous
incentives. Some segments of the mutual fund industry, for example, compete for funds in chan-
nels where sensitivity to performance is less than in other channels.” Langevoort, supra note 99, at
1062.
220. Fisch, supra note 4, at 1994; see also Jonathan B. Berk & Jing Xu, Persistence and Fund
Flows of the Worst Performing Mutual Funds 16 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/2004Fall/MicroFall2004/micro-berk-pa
per2-persist-120204.pdf (discussing persistence and survival of worst-performing mutual funds).
221. The subject of financial literacy and comprehension is vast and established by many
scholars in legal and other fields.  The following is a list of sources that may point an interested
reader in the right direction for a more in-depth discussion of this rich field. Annamaria Lusardi,
Household Savings Behavior in the United States: The Role of Literacy, Information, and Finan-
cial Education Programs, in POLICYMAKING INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 109, 121
(Christopher L. Foote et al., eds., 2009); MUNNELL & SUND ´EN, supra note 67, at 47–49; Molly
Mercer, et al., supra note 27; Colleen E. Medill, supra note 41.
222. Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 15
(1976) (emphasis added).
For example, an elderly retired person about to invest $200 in a savings account at an
unregulated savings and loan association might find that a substantial portion of the
investment, as well as a significant amount of time and effort, would be consumed were
he to seek and obtain information relevant to the risk presented by the account. An
expenditure of money for financial statements might itself be purposeless, if he lacks the
sophistication and training necessary to assess such information properly . . . . While the
example is extreme, similar market imperfections undoubtedly affect many public sup-
pliers of capital.
Id. at 15–16.
223. Kelly K. Spors, Small 401(k) Plans Often Pay Big Fees, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052970204621904574251883387338254.html (last visited Aug. 2,
2014); Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 123 (describing fee disclosures as “complicated and
difficult for investors to understand as fees are buried and disclosed in multiple locations.”).
224. Langevoort, supra note 99, at 1049 (describing how “many investors seek to shift respon-
sibility for the investments to others. This is an opportunity—the core of the full-service broker-
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While indirect investors are not as aware of fees as they should be to
make rational investment decisions, they are aware of and swayed by a
fund’s past performance in making their initial investment decision.225 Al-
though investors pay little attention to a fund’s objectives, risk, and costs,
they pay great attention to a fund’s historical returns.226 There is evidence
of investors’ “trend-chasing . . . buying funds with strong recent perform-
ance even though there is little reason to suspect the hot hand to continue
for more than a brief period of time, at best.”227 Past returns are not a guar-
antee or even a good predictor of future, positive returns.228 The fees asso-
ciated with active management and attempts to consistently beat the market
are “widely believed by experts to be a futile practice.”229
Information asymmetries and high information costs relative to overall
investment amount lead investors to inaccurately weigh past fund perform-
ance over fees when making investment allocation decisions. Inefficient
market criticisms are applicable to all investors. Citizen shareholders, how-
ever, are both more locked into this investment form and have fewer tools
to exert market pressure as securities consumers. Their investment choices
are structurally constrained by the options presented for initial investment
allocation and their weakened exit rights potentially diminishing the remedy
of competition.
age business—to use trust-based selling techniques, offering advice that customers sometimes too
readily accept.”).
225. See Fisch, supra note 4, at 2033–34 (suggesting that past performance data is heavily
relied upon by investors because of the structure of disclosures which highlight past performance).
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational
Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1270 & n.1 (2004) (noting that mutual fund performance is
“largely unpredictable from past relative performance” with the evidence of persistent returns
“concentrated in low-liquidity sectors or at shorter horizons”); see also Ronald T. Wilcox, Bar-
gain Hunting or Star Gazing? Investors’ Preferences for Stock Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. 645, 651
(2003) (describing the predictive value of past returns as to future performance as being “weak
and controversial” noting that it remains “difficult to consistently outperform passively managed
index funds.”).
226. Mercer et al., supra note 27, at 432.
227. Langevoort, supra note 99, at 1034–35.
228. Mercer et al., supra note 27, at 430, 433–34 (documenting the reliance of individuals on
past performance in making investment allocation decisions and the evidence that dispels a rela-
tionship between past high returns and future, positive performance). “Capon, Fitzsimons, and
Rice’s survey of households that invest in mutual funds found that a fund’s ‘investment perform-
ance track record’ was the most important factor in investors’ choice of funds. Also, a survey
sponsored by the Investment Company Institute—the trade association of the mutual fund indus-
try—found that 69 percent of fund investors reviewed a fund’s ‘historical performance’ before
investing.” Id. at 433. See also Michael Finke & Shaun Pfeiffer, Performance Gap: The Impact of
Broker Advice and Fund Valuation (Working paper, 2011), available at http://www.academyfinan
cial.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/5B-Finke-Pfeiffer.pdf (describing recent research confirming
the priority investors place on past returns rather than other, more predictive fund features such as
fees and costs).
229. Hutcheson, supra note 35, at 345.
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5. Limitations of Fee Disclosure
Investors receive fee information through a series of SEC-required dis-
closures at the time of investment230 and periodically (quarterly and annu-
ally) throughout the life of the investment.231 Citizen shareholders, because
they invest through ERISA-governed plans, receive additional disclosures
from the DOL.232 Investor disclosures are criticized for an inappropriate
focus on the fund rather than the investment adviser, failure to reach indi-
viduals making investment decisions, lack of comprehension by individu-
als, and incomplete comparative data as to fund fees.
The first criticism can be summarized as the entity-theory criticism,233
which challenges disclosures that focus on the mutual fund as a separate
entity and ignore the function and control of the investment advisers. As
highlighted in Janus Capital, the formal distinction that funds make re-
quired disclosure as a legally distinct entity prevented securities fraud lia-
bility against the investment adviser—the very entity that drafted and
provided the information contained in the disclosure at issue.234 Professor
Anita Krug leverages the entity-centrism criticism as grounds to encourage
security regulators, as well as other regulators, to adopt the reality of how
investment companies operate.235 Focusing disclosures on the investment
adviser rather than the mutual fund and acknowledging individual investors
in the funds as the clients of investment advisers, rather than the funds that
230. Mutual funds must provide a prospectus containing summary and detailed investment
information to investors at the time of purchase.  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Enhanced Disclo-
sures and New Prospectus Delivery Option For Registered Open-End Management Investment
Companies, 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 274 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2009/33-8998.pdf.
231. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of
Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 239, 249, 270, 274 (2004),
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8393.htm.
232. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5.
233. In focusing on entities, financial services regulation tends to neglect how interest-
entity relationships and activities may further or impede regulatory objective. Instead, it
is informed by corporate governance norms, which characteristically have centered on
the entity and, in particular, its internal relationships and functions, usually without ref-
erence to persons (individuals or other entities) outside the entity.
Krug, supra note 176, at 2049.
234. “[The adviser] disseminated the fund prospectuses through its parent company’s Web
site. [The adviser’s] employees drafted and reviewed the Fund prospectuses, including language
about ‘market timing.’ And [the adviser] may well have kept the trustees in the dark about the true
‘market timing’ facts.” Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2312
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. Krug, supra note 176, at 2048.
This tendency may be discerned, for example, in the doctrine that deems a hedge fund or
other private fund (and not its investors), as the client of the fund’s investment adviser
and in the mutual fund regulatory regime, which aims regulation at the fund rather than
its investment adviser, even though the former is but an instrument for the latter’s pro-
viding of its services.
Id. at 2093.
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sell the pooled investments, are two examples of reforms born of this
critique.236
Second, disclosures are subject to effectiveness and comprehension
critiques. Investment company disclosures suffer from the competing noise
resulting from the inundation of technical, financial disclosures.237 For ex-
ample, the mutual fund prospectuses required under the SEC regulations
and which are available to all investors “have been universally criticized
because they are ‘long and complicated’ and ‘often prove difficult for in-
vestors to use efficiently in comparing their many choices.’”238 A litany of
criticisms deride the efficiency of such disclosures as they relate to individ-
ual investors’ decisions. Such criticisms include assertions that “ordinary
investors likely pay little attention to or are overwhelmed by the minutia
currently presented, and expert analysis of these disclosures, even if it ex-
ists, does not seem to be engendering competition.”239 Investors “face the
daunting task of interpreting the information, determining its credibility,
and collectively pursuing their shareholder rights.”240
The SEC and the DOL have not been unresponsive to disclosure con-
cerns. For example, the SEC in November 2007, proposed a layered ap-
proach to disclosures to include a summary section of “key information” in
plain English at the beginning of the prospectus.241 Additionally, new DOL
regulations regarding citizen-shareholder-specific disclosures attempted to
enhance clarity of fee structures for funds included in employer-sponsored
236. Id. at 2058–59. To better serve the securities regulation goal of investor protection and
market integrity, regulations should focus on the end-user investors (like citizen shareholders) as
the clients and the ultimate bearers of risk, as well as the actors (investment advisers as actors not
the funds). Id. at 2044.
237. Rodrigues, supra note 8, at 1853–55 (describing disclosures as failures because addi-
tional disclosures are “noisy” and “easy for investors to ignore” and offering little by the way of
tangible result).
238. Black, supra note 77, at 325.
239. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 568.
240. Choi, supra note 94, at 46.
241. Black, supra note 77, at 327. The SEC also issued new Investment Company advertising
rules that require sales materials to contain information not always found in the prospectus, such
as disclosures regarding “investment objectives, risks and fees, and to present explanatory infor-
mation” prominently as well as include the most recent month-end performance data. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239,
270, 274 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8294.htm; see also FIN. INDUS.
REG. AUTH., SEC Amends Investment Company Advertising Rules, (Jan. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/MemberAlerts/2004/p002756.
The SEC focused on target date funds because of the decline of defined-benefit pensions and the
growth of the defined-contribution society where “Americans are increasingly responsible for con-
structing and managing their own retirement portfolios”; a task that can be “challenging” and
require “significant knowledge and commitment of time.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Invest-
ment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund Names and Marketing, 17 C.F.R. pts.
230, 270 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9126.pdf.
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plans.242 The DOL rules address two categories of disclosures: (1) plan re-
lated information and (2) investment information.
New regulations regarding plan related information require fiduciaries
to provide participants with (a) general plan information including invest-
ment options within the plan and whether participants can select invest-
ments outside of the plan through a brokerage window,243 (b) information
regarding administrative fees and expenses which are charged or deducted
from participant accounts, and (c) information regarding individual ex-
penses or fees for account actions such as load fees for allocation deci-
sions.244 In addition, fiduciaries must provide participants with at least
quarterly statements “showing the dollar amount of the plan-related fees
and expenses (whether ‘administrative’ or ‘individual’) actually charged to
or deducted from their individual accounts, along with a description of the
services for which the charge or deduction was made.”245
The investment data to be provided is a subset of plan information
because it requires fiduciaries to disclose information regarding plan op-
tions including (a) historical performance data of one-, five-, and ten-year
returns or fixed rates of return;246 and (b) benchmark data for non-fixed
return rate options including historical returns of the market over one-, five-
and ten-year periods. Participants are also entitled to receive information
regarding the total annual operating expenses, “expressed as both a percent-
age of assets and as a dollar amount for each $1,000 invested” and informa-
tion regarding restrictions on additional purchase or withdraw decisions.247
In addition, participant disclosures must include a website address with ad-
ditional investment information and a glossary of investment-related terms
to facilitate participant comprehension of disclosed information.248
Opaque fee components, loose standards for maximum fees, decreased
competition, and obstacles to comprehension create a flawed disclosure sys-
242. The final rule also provides that when a plan allocates investment responsibilities to
participants or beneficiaries, the plan administrator must take steps to ensure that such
participants and beneficiaries, on a regular and periodic basis, are made aware of their
rights and responsibilities with respect to the investment of assets held in, or contributed
to, their accounts and are provided sufficient information regarding the plan and the
plan’s investment options, including fee and expense information, to make informed
decisions with regard to the management of their individual accounts.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
243. “Your employer can simply add something called a self-directed option, also known as a
brokerage or mutual fund window. At that point, your 401(k) or similar account becomes like a
regular brokerage account, where you can buy any mutual or exchange-traded fund (and in some
cases, any individual stock) you want.” Ron Lieber, Seeking Investment Flexibility In a 401(k),
N.Y. TIMES, (July 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/your-money/401ks-and-similar-
plans/a-401k-window-to-more-investing-choices-yourmoney.html?_moc.semityn.www=&page
wanted=print.
244. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 2–3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
245. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 2; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
246. Investment options with fixed rates of return include bonds, CDs, and certain annuities.
247. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 2–3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
248. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
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tem for indirect investors that is especially acute for citizen shareholders
who are more locked into their investments.
V. CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS: A WAY FORWARD
In this Article I developed the citizen shareholder identity as distinct
from other investors on the grounds of choice, exit, and number of in-
termediaries inserted into the investment chain. I argued that these differ-
ences impact citizen shareholders in several ways, focusing primarily on
relatively weakened exit rights, unique conflicts of interest, exacerbated
mutual fund governance critiques, additional expense charges, and in-
creased opacity of fees.
The defined-contribution society inextricably links individual and so-
cial financial security with the success of private securities markets. It is of
vital importance that this great experiment succeed. The following discus-
sion highlights two possible paths (out of a set of solutions that are limited
only by creativity)249 to begin addressing some of the criticisms raised in
this Article and to promote the success of our defined-contribution society.
A. A Theoretical Approach to Incorporating Citizen Shareholders’
Interests
The theoretical approach requires a conceptual shift in thinking and the
adoption of new corporate language responsive to the growing and evolving
reality of how many investors enter the market and why. The theoretical
approach asks that corporate law—its academics, its regulators, and its
practitioners—first acknowledge the existence of the citizen shareholder
under the larger heading of “shareholder.” In adopting a nuanced and com-
plex view of corporate actors and governance structures, we should have
language to describe this group of investors with their unique constraints in
how they enter and invest in the markets. Recognizing citizen shareholders’
identity and structural constraints will likely challenge dominant corporate
theories regarding assumption of risk, ameliorating exit remedies, and in-
vestment theory.250
249. Additional reforms could focus on stricter regulations of employer-sponsors or the plan
service providers, caps set on fees, greater standardization of investment options included in de-
fined-contribution plans, enhanced reporting of fees, limitations with regard to revenue sharing,
enhanced voting, and information rights extended to indirect shareholder.
250. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Determine Your Risk Tolerance, http://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/roadmap/risk.htm#Risk (last visited May 8, 2014) (“But what about risk? All invest-
ments involve taking on risk. It’s important that you go into any investment in stocks, bonds or
mutual funds with a full understanding that you could lose some or all of your money in any one
investment.”). See also Morley & Curtis, supra note 59, at 102–05 (describing exit as a dominant
mutual fund investor strategy despite the presence of switching costs such as load fees and poten-
tial tax consequences); Hawley et al., supra note 43, at 5 (discussing challenges to modern portfo-
lio theory based upon known investor herding behavior and information asymmetries).
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While investors as a group have diverse interests in ownership, the
commonalities of citizen shareholders allow us to make assumptions based
on how they enter the securities market. For example, citizen shareholders
can be presumed to have a long-term investment time horizon. Addition-
ally, citizen shareholders are predominantly invested in mutual and index
funds and are, thus, indirect shareholders. Market analysis reveals that the
major mutual and index funds included in employer-sponsored, self-di-
rected defined-contribution plans are invested in many of the same top com-
panies.251 What citizen shareholders own is not a small interest in a direct
company, or even the mutual fund; rather they own a stake in the perform-
ance of the market as a whole. For example, the 2008 stock market crash
had disastrous effects on individuals’ retirement savings (and confidence in
the defined-contribution system), but retirement portfolios generally re-
bounded with the bull market of early 2013.252 An interest in market per-
formance is consistent with common mutual fund portfolios as well.
Approximately 75 percent of a typical investment company’s portfolio re-
turns come from average market performance rather than equity holdings
unique to a particular fund.253
The exposure to systemic risk for individual and institutional investors
lends support to the notion of an identifiable interest in long-term invest-
ment strategies that advocate sustainable health and growth of the markets
for this group of shareholders.254 The universal investor theory, first articu-
lated by Professors Hawley and Williams, acknowledges that many institu-
tional investors own an interest in the economy as a whole and that their
“long-term return is determined not merely by the performance of each in-
dividual firm it owns, but by the performance of the economy as a
whole.”255 Establishing the citizen shareholder as a unique corporate actor
251. Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder, supra note 15, at 1334–40 (describing the intercon-
nectedness of top mutual funds and public companies in which they invest).
252. See, e.g., Chris Farrell, Record Stock Market and Your Retirement Portfolio, FORBES
.COM, (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2013/03/08/record-stock-market-
and-your-retirement-portfolio/.
253. In general (after controlling for interaction effects), about three-quarters of a typical
fund’s variation in time-series returns comes from general market movement, with the remaining
portion split roughly evenly between the specific asset allocation and active management. In a
year like 2008, almost all funds are down, whereas in a year like 2009, almost all funds are up,
despite their specific asset allocation or active management activities.  Roger G. Ibbotson, The
Importance of Asset Allocation, 66 FIN. ANALYSIS J. 18, 20 (2010), available at http://corporate
.morningstar.com/us/documents/MethodologyDocuments/ResearchPapers/ImportanceOfAssetAl
location.pdf.
254. “The recent financial crisis illustrates this phenomenon, which produced an unexpected
global correlation of risks that lopped $5.4 trillion (20%) off global pension assets in 2008 alone,
accelerated the closure of defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and ravaged retirement security for
millions of plan participants.” Hawley et al., supra note 43, at 5.
255. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at xv–29. “The universal owner’s concern with the
overall economic performance is the recognition that it ‘owns’ the economy (typically, a highly
representative sample of the economy) and, therefore, bears the cost of any shortfall in economic
efficiency and reaps the rewards of any improvement.” Id. at 21. See also ROBERT A. G. MONS
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with an identifiable interest in long-term investment and preference for mu-
tual or index funds lends modern support to the notion of the universal
investor. Our national retirement system is leveraged, in significant part, on
the success of private securities markets as a whole. The theoretical ap-
proach advanced here would recognize citizen shareholders and encourage
corporations—at both the operating and the investment company levels—to
recognize long-term sustainability as a goal of corporate performance.
Additionally, incorporating the citizen shareholder identity into the
corporate governance and securities frameworks facilitates careful examina-
tion of how the system works for this group of investors and identifies
weaknesses, inequities, and disproportionate consequences. Only after thor-
ough inquiry, examination, and debate, can robust solutions be identified
and tested. For example, recognizing citizen shareholders as relatively dis-
advantaged indirect owners lends support for existing calls to reform the
investment company governance structure made by Professors Jill Fisch,256
William Birdthistle,257 and Anita Krug.258
For example, employing the citizen shareholder lens focuses critiques
on fee disclosures and suggests that they should be designed with the struc-
tural constraints and information asymmetries of citizen shareholders in
mind. Doing so could promote greater fee competition and market effi-
ciency, discourage conflicts of interests that add extra costs, and encourage
better investment practices. The following discussion explores disclosure
criticisms and reforms with special attention paid to the unique position of
citizen shareholders.
B. A Practical Approach: Focusing on Fees
My regulatory suggestion focuses where citizen shareholders have the
most incentives to participate—in their investment decisions made at the
plan level. Better, not more, disclosure could facilitate improved investment
decisions by citizen shareholders and promote greater competition in the
mutual and index fund markets by making the focus of disclosures investor
comprehension, rather than employer-sponsor liability avoidance.
Facilitating better choices and comprehension by citizen shareholders
of their investment options and the consequences of their choices is impera-
tive to encourage competitive mutual fund markets as well as to securing
sufficient individual and social retirement savings. The revised DOL disclo-
AND NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
121 (1996); Stout, supra note 8, at 89–90 (2012).
256. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 4; Fisch, supra note 33, at 878.
257. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mu-
tual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 69–70 (2010); Birdthistle, supra note 4, at
785–86; Birdthistle, supra note 98.
258. See, e.g., Krug, supra note 75, at 305–18 (discussing a financial services approach to
investment companies as an alternative).
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sures described in Section IV(E) are a step in the right direction; however,
they do not cure the underlying criticisms of the disclosure-based regime,
which assumes that the disclosed information is relevant to and understand-
able by the recipients. Two criticisms remain: (1) incompleteness of infor-
mation disclosed (and its form) and (2) comprehension.
The information transparency and comprehension problems (collec-
tively referred to as information asymmetries) are aggravated with citizen
shareholders, as compared to indirect investors, for three reasons. First, em-
ployer sponsors (or a third-party investment adviser) select investment op-
tions limiting choice. While there is some obligation to maintain reasonable
fees under ERISA, that duty is easily satisfied if the fees are comparable to
market fees, even though the mutual fund market is arguably inefficient in
the fee arena.259 Second, revenue sharing practices allow investors in de-
fined-contribution plans to be charged additional fees as a means to offset
the administrative costs otherwise charged to the employer-sponsor to over-
see the plan. Citizen shareholders face conflict of interest problems both at
the investor adviser level and at the employer-sponsor level. Third, the self-
directed aspect of defined-contribution plans eliminates most fiduciary duty
liability for employer-sponsors. Additionally, investment advisers and in-
vestment companies that comprise the menu options within an employer’s
plan are usually structured so that they are not fiduciaries under ERISA and,
thus, owe no fiduciary duties to citizen shareholders.260
As to the first criticism (incompleteness), certain mutual fund fees re-
main hidden from disclosure. Hidden fees include “expense ratios and a
second category of transaction costs such as commissions between fund
managers and brokerage firms, soft dollar expenses, variable annuity
charges, pass through fees associated with administrators or auditors, and
retail versions of institutional funds.”261 Additionally, the DOL’s revised
fee regulations do not show citizen shareholders the impact that fees have
on their individual accounts over time but instead include “generic lan-
guage” about the impact fees have on investment returns over time.262
Moreover, the fee disclosures provided to citizen shareholders do not in-
259. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
260. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 116.
261. Hutcheson, supra note 35, at 356.
[T]he expense “ratio is somewhat misleading because it leaves out costs incurred by the
fund when it buys and sells securities on the fund’s behalf. These transaction costs
include, among other things, brokerage commissions, which are separately reported on
the SAI, and the presence of bid-ask spreads, which go unreported. Excluding these
figures causes the expense ratio to understate—at times fairly significantly—the actual
costs incurred by investors.”
Schwartz, supra note 154, at 547; see also Fisch, supra note 4, at 2017–18 (“The use of soft
dollars also masks a fund’s true operating expenses.”).
262. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 196, at 29–30.
In their current form, Labor’s fee disclosure improvements will not actually show U.S.
participants the effect of fees on their accounts over time. Instead, Labor’s recently
issued regulations will require that participant disclosures include generic language on
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clude a “cumulative cost” estimate of fees and do not state all fees charged
to their accounts. For example, fund management fees are not to be in-
cluded in quarterly statements, although estimates on a hypothetical account
balance are included in annual disclosures.263
To calculate the total amount of fees paid, a citizen shareholder must
save quarterly statements for a year to aggregate the service expenses re-
ported quarterly charged to her account.264 In addition, she must review the
annual statement to identify the total operating expenses for the year, which
is expressed as a percentage and illustrated as a cost per $1,000 invested.265
The dollar amount reported in the statement must be multiplied until it re-
flects the amount of assets actually invested in the plan (i.e., multiply by 25
if $25,000 is invested, multiply by 50 if $50,000 is invested). That total,
added to the reported expenses disclosed quarterly, would represent the ap-
proximate fees charged for the year. As currently structured, the fee infor-
mation is disclosed but is done in a way that is piecemeal; citizen
shareholders remain responsible to compile, compute, compare, and com-
prehend financial disclosures, including fees.
Disclosures, as required by both the SEC and the DOL, should be reg-
ulated and drafted with the goal of informing investment consumers to
make knowledgeable decisions, not for the primary purpose of avoiding
plan litigation. Transparency and comprehension of disclosures by citizen
shareholders are particularly relevant with regard to fee disclosures and
compilations where gatekeepers—mutual fund boards of directors, the mar-
kets, and employer-sponsors—have proven to be ineffective in monitoring
and imposing fee constraints. Recall that a primary purpose of securities
regulation is to protect investors from opportunistic behaviors within the
securities markets that take advantage of information asymmetries.266 Addi-
tionally, if citizen shareholders are relatively locked into their plan invest-
ments, complete disclosures will inform them about the risks they have
assumed, whether voluntarily or not.
While not a complete solution, enhancing transparency and compre-
hension of fees is a foundational element in encouraging market competi-
tion and counterbalancing the potential conflicting interests of employer-
the long-term impact of fees and expenses, including that the cumulative effect of fees
and expenses can reduce the growth of a participant’s account.
Id.
263. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 196, at 30.
264. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
265. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 2–3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
266. Securities regulations exist to ensure that investors are adequately protected from
potential opportunistic behavior by securities market counterparties, whether they be
issuers or broker-dealers or other market participants. . . . In other words, the purpose of
securities regulation is to correct a perceived market failure: investors, in policymakers’
perceptions, are not capable of fully protecting their interests given the natural informa-
tion disparities between investors and those who would be the target of or intermediary
for their investment capital.
Krug, supra note 75, at 274–75. See also Licht, supra note 75, at 104.
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sponsors and other plan servicers like investment advisers. The following
suggestions are based, in part, on examples of more complete and compara-
tive disclosures found in other countries with robust defined-contribution
pension systems such as Chile, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Swe-
den.267 Because fund fees impact retirement returns, but are difficult for
individual investors to identify, understand, and compare, disclosures
should be (1) standardized, (2) individualized, and (3) comparative.
Citizen shareholders should receive fee information both at the time of
investment and in annual statements, written in plain language that is stan-
dardized so that fees are reported in similar ways for similar investment
vehicles in all employer-sponsored plans.268 As employees move from one
job to the next, the information would be presented in familiar formats re-
ducing information costs for the consumer. Consistent presentation of infor-
mation would familiarize participants with the disclosures, facilitate
investor education that is not idiosyncratic to individual employers, and
streamline disclosure formats for employers.
Fee disclosures should be complete and descriptive of the total fees
paid by each participant.269 Other countries provide this level of informa-
tion to defined-contribution participants in what is called individualized dis-
closures.270  Individualized disclosures to citizen shareholders should
provide information as to what each investor pays in total administrative
and management fees, expressed as a single dollar amount relative to the
individual account. Individualized disclosures should not allow for soft dol-
lar exclusions and should include transactional and operational costs in-
curred on the account.271
Finally, disclosures should facilitate comparisons not only of return
rates,272 but also of fees. The comparisons should include the funds and
investment options selected by the participant, a benchmark or industry av-
erage for that type of asset class, as well as the fees charged by other invest-
ment options within the employer’s plan. Comparative disclosures would
enhance investors’ ability to assess and compare fees and would help inves-
tors understand the importance and impact of fees on fund returns.273 “Ac-
267. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 196, at 22–41.
268. Id. at 23–24. Australian “regulations have enhanced and streamlined the fee disclosures
that participants receive and provide greater certainty and consistency by defining the fees and
costs that were included in a standardized fees and costs template. Officials noted that these im-
proved disclosures have increased the transparency and comparability of data and felt that partici-
pants were more aware of cost issues with respect to their [defined-contribution] plans.” Id. at 24.
269. Id. at 30.
270. Id. at 23–29 (describing individualized statements provided to investors in Sweden,
Chile, and Australia).
271. Id.
272. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 73, at 2–3; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2010).
273. The “literature readily explains why investors rely so heavily on performance data—fund
disclosures tell them to. The funds’ mandated disclosure documents and marketing materials pre-
sent performance as the single most important fund characteristic.” Fisch, supra note 4, at 2033.
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cess to clear comparative information makes it easier for investors to
determine whether the fund they are considering is an expensive one, a
necessary precondition if investors are to choose less expensive alterna-
tives.”274 With citizens shareholders who allocate their savings to be in-
vested among a limited range of investments included in an employer’s
defined-contribution plan, comparative and complete disclosures would be
relatively simple to generate among the limited investment menu within
each plan, regulate, and distribute to participants using existing channels of
investor communication.
Focusing disclosure requirements and structure on comprehension by
distributing complete, individualized, and comparative information would
enhance citizen shareholders’ ability to allocate their investments in a way
that could promote competition and exert market pressure on employer
sponsors and mutual fund managers to help keep fees low.
VI. CONCLUSION
The retirement revolution from defined-benefit to defined-contribution
plans created citizen shareholders. The shifting risks that followed have
been described as a “vast experiment to see how Americans fare in a world
in which retirement planning is an individual responsibility and in which
families bear the resulting risks on their own . . . [with] dire side effects.”275
These challenges have grave potential to impact the financial stability of
our society, as well the ability to affect the level of comfort with which an
individual retires.276
In this Article, I discussed the ways in which citizen shareholders—
investors who enter the securities market primarily through employer spon-
sored, self-directed defined-contribution plans—are distinguishable from
other investors (both direct and indirect). Investing through a retirement
benefit plan positively promotes retirement savings. But that benefit is not
without its costs. It also imposes structural constraints on citizen sharehold-
ers in terms of choice, exit, and number of intermediaries inserted into the
investment chain. These differences exert pressure on governance accounta-
bility mechanisms (most notably in the form of exit and conflicts of inter-
est) and extract additional fees. My observations should not be read as a
veiled call to end defined-contribution plans. My intent is to fully examine
the consequences—both intended and unintended—of the defined-contribu-
tion society where the dominant form of retirement savings in this country
funnels investors into the securities markets.
274. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 570.
275. JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES,
HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 125 (2006).
276. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 116, at 4; see also Schultz, supra note
18; Ghilarducci, supra note 18.
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Citizen shareholders are the fastest growing group of investors, and yet
they remain invisible, largely silent, and distanced from traditional corpo-
rate governance debates. Their capital fuels the markets, but their voices
have few entry points, and the unique constraints of their investment are
largely ignored. Adopting a nuanced view of shareholders that incorporates
the citizen shareholder identity can add context and clarity to both govern-
ance debates and calls for regulatory reform.
